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ABSTRACT
We use the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to show that personal relationships which individuals maintain
for non-economic reasons can be an important determinant of regional economic growth. We show
that West German households who have social ties to East Germany in 1989 experience a persistent
rise in their personal incomes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the presence of these households
significantly affects economic performance at the regional level: it increases the returns to entrepreneurial
activity, the share of households who become entrepreneurs, and the likelihood that firms based within
a given West German region invest in East Germany. As a result, West German regions which (for
idiosyncratic reasons) have a high concentration of households with social ties to the East exhibit substantially
higher growth in income per capita in the early 1990s. A one standard deviation rise in the share of
households with social ties to East Germany in 1989 is associated with a 4.6 percentage point rise
in income per capita over six years. We interpret our findings as evidence of a causal link between
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Economic sociologists argue that the economic success of any entity, be it an individual, a house-
hold, or a geographic region depends on its position in the social structure of the marketplace.
Well-connected individuals who bridge \holes" in this social structure are more likely to be eco-
nomically successful and may generate a competitive advantage for the rms at which they work
and the regions in which they live (Granovetter (1985), Burt (1992)). Personal relationships
which individuals maintain for non-economic reasons may thus be important determinants of
economic development, both at the microeconomic and at the macroeconomic level (Granovetter
(2005)).
Saxenian (1999) gives a striking example of this view. She analyzes the biographies of South-
Indian engineers who migrated to California in the 1970s. Following the liberalization of the
Indian economy in 1991 these immigrants were in a unique position to leverage their social ties
to relatives and friends in Hyderabad and Bangalore. Many excelled in their personal careers
running outsourcing operations for US rms. Saxenian argues that by connecting Silicon Valley
rms to low-cost and high quality labor in their regions of origin, these South-Indian immigrants
became instrumental in the emergence of their home regions as major hubs of the global IT
services industry.
The work of economic sociologists thus raises a fundamental challenge to economists: Can
the pattern of social ties between individuals determine the growth trajectory of entire regions?
While such a causal link between social ties and economic growth is consistent with a large
class of network-based models in which social ties provide `social' collateral for economic trans-
actions (Greif (1993), Besley and Coate (1995)) or reduce informational frictions (Varian (1990),
Stiglitz (1990)), it has to date proven impossible to identify empirically.
The reason is that any empirical test of a causal link between social ties and aggregate
economic outcomes faces a two-tiered reverse-causality problem. At the microeconomic level,
individuals may form social ties as a result of economic interaction or in anticipation of future
economic benets (immigrants may strategically form social ties in Bangalore because they antic-
ipate the liberalization of the Indian economy). At the aggregate level, the regional distribution
of social ties is a result of decisions of individuals about where to live, and these decisions are
again endogenous to economic incentives (engineers do not randomly migrate to California).
Identifying a causal link between social ties and aggregate economic outcomes thus requires (i)
identifying `real friends', i.e.social ties that formed without regard to future economic benets,
and (ii) some exogenous variation in the regional distribution of these exogenously formed social
1ties. In general, and in the Indian example above in particular, such exogenous variation either
does not exist or cannot be measured.
In this paper we argue that the fall of the Berlin Wall provides a unique historical setting
which enables us to overcome both layers of reverse causality and to estimate the causal eect
of social ties between individuals living in dierent regions on regional economic growth. In
addition, we are able to trace this eect on regional economic growth to its microeconomic
underpinnings by documenting a causal eect of social ties on entrepreneurial activity, on the
investment behavior of rms, and on household income.
The rst key advantage of this setting is the fact that the partition of Germany was generally
believed to be permanent. After the physical separation of the two German states in 1961, private
economic exchange between the two Germanies was impossible. Individuals maintaining social
ties across the inner-German border during this period did so for purely non-economic reasons.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 1989, trade between the two Germanies
suddenly became feasible, and in fact there was a boom in economic exchange between West
and East.1 To the extent that social ties facilitate economic exchange, social ties between West
and East Germans thus unexpectedly took on economic value on the day of the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Indeed, we show that West Germans who report to be in contact with friends or relatives
in East Germany in 1989 experience a signicant increase in the growth rate of their personal
income after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The second key advantage of the natural experiment surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall
is that the idiosyncrasies of Germany's post war history resulted in substantial variation across
West German regions in the fraction of households with social ties to East Germany. In 1945
all German residents were expelled from Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia (which all became
part of Poland and Russia) and allocated to the areas which would later become West and East
Germany according to quotas xed in the Potsdam Agreement. Between the founding of the
East German state in 1948 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the vast majority
(2.8 million) of expellees allocated to East Germany migrated to the West after having lived
in East Germany for up to 16 years. During the same period, an additional 3 million refugees
who had lived in East Germany before World War II also ed to West Germany. We show that
West German regions which received a large inow of these two groups of migrants from East
Germany (henceforth `the East') have signicantly stronger social ties to the East in 1989.
1This boom was fueled by large transfers from West to East. These included both direct and indirect govern-
ment transfers. For example, the East German Mark was converted to the Deutsche Mark at several times its
market value. See (Sinn and Sinn, 1992, p. 51) and Lange and Pugh (1998), respectively.
2Of course, the assignment of migrants to West German regions might not be random, since
individuals may have strategically settled in those regions in which they saw the best prospects
for long-term economic growth. However, an overwhelming concern for those arriving from the
East was an acute lack of housing. During World War II almost a third of the West German
housing stock was destroyed. In some areas only 4.4% of the housing stock that existed in 1939
was habitable in 1946. Variation in wartime destruction thus made it more dicult to settle
in some parts of West Germany than in others at the time when millions of migrants arrived
from the East. We argue that the extent of destruction in 1946 provides the exogenous source
of variation in the regional distribution of social ties which we need in order to identify a causal
eect of social ties on regional economic outcomes post 1989.
Using the degree of wartime destruction in 1946 as an instrument, we show a strong relation-
ship between the share of migrants from the East settling in a given West German region, the
share of households reporting to have social ties to the East in 1989, and changes in the growth
rate of income per capita post 1989: a one standard deviation rise in the share of migrants from
the East settling in a given West German region before 1961 is associated with a 4.6% rise in
income per capita over the six years between 1989 and 1995.2 While this regional growth eect
diminishes after 1995, there is no evidence of a subsequent reversal. The pattern of social ties
to the East which existed in 1989 may therefore have permanently altered the distribution of
income across West German regions.
The main identifying assumption for the causal interpretation of our region-level results is
that the degree of wartime destruction in 1945 (or any omitted factors driving it) aects changes
in the growth rate of income per capita post 1989 only through its eect on the settlement of
migrants from East Germany after World War II, and that the presence of these migrants indeed
aects growth post 1989 exclusively due to their social ties to East Germany. We devote a great
deal of care to corroborating this identifying assumption in various ways. For example, we show
that wartime destruction is uncorrelated with pre war population growth, that it aects post war
population growth only until the 1960s, and that it has no eect on the growth rate of income
per capita in West German regions in the years before 1989. In addition, all of our specications
are robust to controlling for growth in income per capita in the years prior to 1989. Moreover, we
show that our results are particular to migrants arriving from East Germany and not to migrants
arriving directly from the areas that became part of Poland and Russia: the settlement of the
2This result is robust to several dierent variations in the estimation strategy and cannot be explained by
likely alternatives, such as migration from East to West in 1989 or by a decline in West German manufacturing
in the 1990s.
3group of expellees who were allocated directly to West Germany in 1945, those who did not settle
in East Germany before arriving in the West, has no eect on income growth post 1989.
In an eort to shed light on the mechanism linking social ties to regional economic growth,
we estimate separate eects for the incomes of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. While
both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs who live in regions with strong social ties to the East
experience a signicant rise in their incomes, the incomes of entrepreneurs increase at more than
three times the rate of those of non-entrepreneurs. Consistent with this observation, the share
of the population engaged in entrepreneurial activity rises in regions with strong social ties to
the East.
We then trace this eect on entrepreneurial activity to the investment behavior of West
German rms: we show that West German rms which are headquartered in a region which had
strong social ties to the East in 1989 are more likely to operate a subsidiary or a branch in East
Germany in 2007. In particular, a one standard deviation rise in the share of migrants from
East Germany settling in a region before 1961 is associated with a 3.4 percentage point increase
in the likelihood that a given rm within that region invests in East Germany after the fall of
the Berlin Wall. While social ties to East Germany predict a higher probability of investing in
East Germany, they do not predict a higher probability of investing anywhere else in the world,
except for a small rise in the probability of investing in Poland. This latter nding is notable as
about half of those arriving in West Germany from East Germany before 1961 were originally
expelled from present-day Poland in 1945.
Finally, we show that individual households who have social ties to East Germany in 1989
internalize part of the income growth which they generate at the regional level. The income
growth of households who have ties to at least one relative in the East is on average 5 percentage
points higher over the six years following the fall of the Berlin Wall than that of comparable
households who have no such ties. This nding is again robust to controlling for a wide range
of covariates, such as growth in household income prior to 1989, as well as the age, gender, and
level of education of the household head. Moreover, the rise in income occurs immediately after
1989 and is particular to households who report personal contact with a relative or friend in the
East in 1989. Households of migrants from the East who have no such personal contact do not
experience a signicant rise in their incomes. We also show that households prot from their ties
to relatives in East Germany regardless of their level of capital income in 1989.3
3A potential confounding factor to our econometric analysis is that West Germans whose property had been
expropriated by the East German government prior to 1961 could apply for restitution of their property after
reunication. While we are able to control for restitutions directly at the household level, we are unable to do so
at the regional level. However, we show that the volume of restitutions received by West Germans prior to 1995
4We believe the most plausible interpretation of our results is that West German households
which had social ties to East Germany in 1989 had a comparative advantage in seizing the new
economic opportunities in the East. Having personal relationships with East Germans may have
given them access to valuable information about local demand conditions or about the quality of
East German assets that were oered to investors. (Almost the entire East German capital stock
was sold to private investors between 1990 and 1994.) This comparative advantage resulted in a
persistent rise in their household incomes but also appears to have generated growth in income
per capita and increased returns to entrepreneurial activity at the regional level. Part of this
eect on regional economic performance may be explained if rms owned by a household with
social ties to the East (or rms with access to a local labor force with such ties) had a comparative
advantage in investing in East Germany. An obvious caveat to this interpretation is that it is
unclear how our results generalize beyond the context of a large economic transition, such as the
economic re-integration of Germany, in which markets are established rapidly and informational
asymmetries are large.
A large literature shows that measures of anity between regions, such as trust, telephone
volume, and patterns of historical migration, correlate strongly with aggregate economic out-
comes, such as foreign direct investment (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)), international
asset ows (Portes and Rey (2005)) and trade (Rauch and Trindade (2002)). Relative to this
literature we innovate in three dimensions. First, we are able to establish causation rather than
correlation. Second, we are able to examine economic growth as an outcome variable directly; and
third, we are able to tie our aggregate measure of anity directly to individual level data about
personal relationships within an environment in which we can exclude dierences in preferences,
culture, and language as alternative explanations with a high degree of certainty.4 Our work
thus provides evidence that social ties between individuals can causally aect macroeconomic
outcomes, which is a link that is implicit in a wide range of models that feature network-based
economic interaction.5
By tracing the eect of social ties on regional economic growth to household income, en-
trepreneurial activity, and rm investment, our paper also provides evidence on the microeco-
nomic channels through which social ties may aect economic growth. In this sense our results
relate to a large literature which links social networks and social ties to a broad set of microeco-
is too small to induce a relevant bias in our estimates.
4Note however that all of our results are about income growth at the regional level and that we are unable to
make any statements about income growth at the country level.
5See for example Rauch (1999), Kranton and Minehart (2001), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Karlan,
Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2009), Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl (2010), and Chaney (2011).
5nomic outcomes, ranging from education (Sacerdote (2001)) and employment (Munshi (2003))
to performance in the nancial industry (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008)) and agricultural
yields (Conley and Udry (2009)).6
Our estimates imply that individual households who have social ties to East Germany in 1989
appear to internalize only a small part of the income growth which they generate at the regional
level. They suggest the presence of a `social multiplier' (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman
(2003)) through which residents of a region with a high concentration of households who have
social ties to the East experience a rise in their incomes even if they themselves have no such
ties to the East.7
As the patterns of social ties which we identify in our analysis are driven by an internal
migration post World War II, our paper also relates to a large literature on the economic eects
of migration.8 We add to this literature by providing evidence of a distinct channel through
which large-scale migration may aect long-run economic growth.9
Other papers have used German reunication as a testing ground for economic theory. Most
closely related are the papers by Fuchs-Sch undeln and Sch undeln (2005) who identify the role of
risk aversion in occupational choice, Redding and Sturm (2008) who estimate the importance of
market access for economic development, and Alesina and Fuchs-Sch undeln (2007) who estimate
the eect of communist rule on political preferences.10
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant history
of post war Germany. Section 3 discusses the data and its construction. Section 4 identies the
eect of social ties on regional economic growth. Section 5 traces this eect to the eect of social
ties on entrepreneurial activity, rm investment, and household income. Section 6 concludes.
The online appendix contains additional robustness checks and details on the construction of our
dataset.
6See also Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Beaman (2011),
Kuhnen (2009), and Shue (2011).
7Moretti (2004) discusses the evidence on similar spill-overs from human capital in cities.
8See for example Friedberg (2001) and the references therein.
9In highlighting a channel through which wartime destruction suddenly aects changes in regional income
growth 45 years after it was inicted, our work also provides an interesting contrast with the long-standing result
in urban economics that wartime destruction has no long-run eect on the size of cities and towns. See Brakman,
Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) for Germany, Davis and Weinstein (2002) for Japan and Miguel and Roland
(2011) for Vietnam.
10Also see Bursztyn and Cantoni (2009) and Ahfeldt, Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2010).
62 Historical Background
2.1 Destruction of Housing Stock during World War II
German cities and towns were heavily destroyed after World War II. This was mainly the result
of allied air raids, which began in 1940 and intensied until the nal days of the war in 1945.
They left around 500,000 dead and resulted in the destruction of a third of the West German
housing stock, making it the most devastating episode of air warfare in history.11
In the early days of the war the Royal Air Force attempted to slow down the advance of the
German army into the Soviet Union by destroying transport infrastructure. This strategy failed
and was quickly abandoned, as the technology available at the time did not permit targeted
raids. At best, the pilots ying the nighttime raids were able to make out that they were above
a city (and they were often even unsure which city lay below). This led to the adoption of the
doctrines of `moral bombing' (1941) and of `re and carpet bombing', which aimed at destroying
the German morale by destroying cities and towns (Kurowski (1977)). By the end of the war,
50% of the 900,000 metric tons of bombs had hit residential areas, while 17% had hit industry
or infrastructure.
The most heavily-damaged cities during the early years of the war were those that were close
to the British shore and easy to spot from the air, e.g. Hamburg and Cologne. After 1944, the
Allies used recent technological advances to implement re storms, which were easiest to create
in cities with highly ammable, historical centers, such as Darmstadt, Dresden, and W urzburg.
Fire storms could typically not be implemented in cities which had already been hit by a large
number of explosive bombs, as the rubble from earlier raids would prevent the re from spreading.
This is why the cities that were attacked late in the war (often strategically the least important)
were among the most heavily destroyed.12
Appendix Figure 1 shows the varying intensity of destruction in West German regions. Note
that none of our empirical results rely on this pattern being random or driven by specic fac-
tors. Instead, our identication strategy relies on the assumption that the pattern of wartime
destruction or any omitted variables driving it have no direct eect on changes in growth rates
of West German regions 45 years later, post 1989.
11The information presented in this section is from USGPO (1945), Kurowski (1977), and Friedrich (2002).
12During a re storm, a large section of a city catches re, creating winds of up to 75 meters per second,
depriving those exposed of oxygen and often sucking them into the re.
72.2 The Partition and Reunication of Germany
In 1944, as World War II entered its nal phase, the UK, the US, and the Soviet Union agreed on a
protocol for the partition of pre war Germany: the areas to the east of the rivers Oder and Neisse
(Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia) were to be annexed by Poland and by the Soviet Union,
and the remaining territory was to be divided into three sectors of roughly equal population size.
The UK would occupy the Northwest, the US the South, and the Soviet Union the East. The
capital, Berlin, would be jointly occupied. At the end of the war, the three armies took control
of their sectors, and the US and Britain carved a small French sector out of their territory. In
1949, with the onset of the Cold War, the three Western sectors formed the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany), and the Soviet sector became the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany). Economic exchange between the two parts of Germany became increasingly
dicult as the East German government rapidly introduced central planning. In 1952 the border
was completely sealed, cutting any remaining legal or illegal trade links between East and West.13
Until the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, there remained the possibility of
personal transit from East to West Berlin, which was the last remaining outlet for East Germans
to ee to West Germany. After 1961, migration between East and West virtually ceased. In
the following years the partition of Germany was formally recognized in various international
treaties, and was, until the late summer of 1989, generally believed to be permanent.14
In September of 1989, it became apparent that a critical mass of East Germans had become
alienated from the socialist state, its declining economic performance, and the restrictions it
placed on personal freedom. Increasingly large public demonstrations led to the opening of the
Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989. The rst free elections in East Germany were held in March
of 1990, followed by the rapid political, monetary, and economic union between East and West
Germany by the end of the same year.
2.3 Refugees and Expellees in West Germany, 1945-1961
In 1945 the Polish and Soviet authorities expelled all German nationals from annexed territory
so that these areas could be inhabited by Polish (and Soviet) nationals. Those that did not
13The only remaining trade between the two countries was the `Interzonenhandel' which was arranged between
the two governments. In this system the East German government would trade goods and services with the West
German government by the barter system. In 1960 its total volume came to the equivalent of $178 m. See Holbik
and Myers (1964) for a detailed description of the Interzonenhandel.
14The most important of these treaties was the `Grundlagenvertrag' of December 1972 between East and West
Germany in which both countries recognized `two German states in one German nation'. Following this treaty
East and West Germany were accepted as full members of the United Nations.
8leave on their own accord (many had ed the advancing Soviet army in the nal months of the
war) were marched or transported towards the four sectors. We refer to former residents of the
annexed territory as `expellees' (Vertriebene). Ethnic Germans that either originally lived in or
moved to the countries occupied by the German army during war were also expelled in many
cases, particularly from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Expellees were
registered and then assigned to one of the four sectors, according to quotas xed in the Potsdam
Agreement.15 The authorities of the sectors in turn allocated the expellees to the states within
their jurisdictions and assigned them quarters wherever they could nd intact housing stock.
The rst wave of 5.96 million expellees arrived in the three Western sectors by 1946. We
refer to this group as `direct expellees'. As it became increasingly apparent that the division
of Germany would become permanent, most of the expellees that had originally been allocated
to the Soviet sector (2.8 million) also left for the West. These `expellees via the Soviet sector'
are critical to our empirical analysis as they lived in East Germany for up to 16 years before
migrating to West Germany and thus had the opportunity to form social ties to East Germans.
By 1960, the total number of expellees in West Germany had risen to 9.0 million, of which
roughly one third were expellees via the Soviet sector.16
In parallel, an increasing number of native residents of the Soviet sector who were dissatised
with the political and economic prospects of the edging East Germany ed to the West. This
ow of `refugees' (Fl uchtlinge) peaked in the years before the construction of the Berlin Wall,
with on average around 300,000 individuals illegally crossing the border in each year between
1957 and 1961 (Hunt (2006)). By 1961 the total number of East German refugees settled in West
Germany was 3 million.
While the occupying authorities in the western sectors, and later the West German authorities,
had an explicit policy of supplying expellees with housing and various subsidies, there was very
little support for refugees. In fact, as late as 1950 the authorities actively tried to discourage
refugees from entering West Germany on the grounds that they would exasperate an already
catastrophic housing situation and in fear of the political consequences of de-populating East
Germany. However, the authorities never attempted to deport refugees back to the East, and
so refugees often made their own way in West Germany without registering with the authorities
(Bethlehem (1982, chapter 3)). The severe housing crisis that resulted from the inow of millions
15The ocial plan adopted by the allies in November 1945 was to expel 6.65 million Germans. 2.75 million,
were to be allocated to the Soviet sector and 2.25 million, 1.5 million, and 0.15 million to the American, British,
and French sectors, respectively (Bethlehem (1982), p.29).
16We are unable to determine exactly how many expellees remained in East Germany, as the communist
government declared after 1950 that the expellees had been fully integrated into East German society and banned
the concept from subsequent government statistics (Franzen (2001)).
9of migrants into the heavily destroyed Western sectors remained the principal determinant of the
allocation of expellees and refugees to West German cities and towns until the late 1950s.17
3 The Data
We use data at the household, rm, district (Landkreis), and regional (Raumordnungseinheit)
level. Districts are the equivalent of US counties. Regions are the union of several districts,
and each district belongs to one such unit. Regions do not have a political function but exist
exclusively for statistical purposes. (In this sense they are analogous to metropolitan statistical
areas in the US, but they also encompass rural areas.) Most of our aggregate data is available
at the district level, except for data on income per capita and employment before 1995, which
is available only at the regional level. Our primary units of analysis are the 74 West German
regions (excluding Berlin), of which we drop three for which we have no information on wartime
destruction. When we use aggregate controls in our rm- and household-level analysis we always
use data at the lowest level of aggregation available.
3.1 Region-Level Data
The 1961 census reports the number of inhabitants and the number of expellees in each West
German district. The census presents the data separately for expellees who arrived directly in
West Germany during or after the war and for expellees who arrived in West Germany after
having registered a residence in the Soviet sector. From these data we created the variables
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 and Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61.18 By contrast, we do not
have reliable regional data on the settlement of refugees arriving from the Soviet sector as refugees
had little incentive to reveal themselves to the authorities. However, since expellees via the Soviet
sector arrived in West Germany around the same time as refugees and since both groups faced
similar constraints regarding the shortage of housing, the settlement pattern of refugees across
West German regions was likely very similar to that of expellees arriving from the Soviet sector.
We therefore use Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 as our primary proxy for the intensity of
17In the early years the availability of housing was the only determinant of where the expellees were assigned
quarters. After 1949 economic considerations started playing a more important role in the allocation process and
the West German government also initiated a number of programs encouraging migration to areas in which there
was a relatively high demand for labor. However, these programs remained relatively limited, with less than one
in ten expellees participating (Bethlehem, 1982, p. 29, pp.49).
18These data were collected at the district level. Some West German district boundaries changed between 1961
and 1989. In those cases we used area weights calculated in ArcGIS to convert 1961 districts into their 1989
equivalents.
10social ties to the East in a given West German region.
For our instrumental variables strategy we coded two measures of wartime destruction: the
share of dwellings that were destroyed in 1946, labeled Share Housing Destroyed '46, and the
amount of rubble in cubic meters per inhabitant, labeled Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.). Both measures
are from the 1946 edition of the annual statistical publication of the German Association of
Cities. The data are reported at the city level for the 199 largest West German cities and towns.
We also coded the number of inhabitants of these towns in 1939 and 1946 from this volume. We
aggregated the data on wartime destruction by calculating the mean destruction across cities
and towns in a district or region, weighted by population in 1939. (Additional details are in
Appendix Table 1).
Our data on income per capita are from the German Mikrozensus, an annual, obligatory
random survey of one percent of the population. We aggregated the individual income data to the
region level for every second year between 1985 and 2001. Income per capita at time t is labeled
Income t (p.c.). As the Mikrozensus does not identify districts prior to 1995, an aggregation
to districts was not possible. We also used the Mikrozensus to construct the average income of
entrepreneurs (Income (p.c.) Entrepreneurs t), the average income of non-entrepreneurs (Income
(p.c.) Non-Entrepreneurs t), as well as the share of entrepreneurs amongst the respondents (Share
Entrepreneurs t) for each region. From the same source we obtained data on the share of the
population working in dierent sectors s of the economy in 1989 (Share Employed in s '89),
where s stands for agriculture, manufacturing, services, and government, respectively. We also
constructed a proxy for the share of the region's population that are migrants arriving from
the East in the years following fall of the Berlin Wall by summing up the share of the region's
population who reported arriving from the East in the Mikrozensus years 1991, 1993 and 1995
(Migration from East '91-'95).19 As an additional control we calculated the distance of the
center of each district or region to the former inner-German border using GIS data (Distance to
East (100 km)).
3.2 Firm-Level Data
Our rm-level data is from the 2007 edition of the ORBIS dataset, which is the edition that
expands coverage to small and medium sized German rms. It includes information on the
location of the headquarters of each West German rm and a list of its subsidiaries and branches.
19We did not obtain data on the share arriving in 1990, 1992 and 1994 as the German Mikrozensus charges a
at fee for accessing the datasets of each year. However, we are condent that the shares arriving in consecutive
years must be highly correlated.
11We use the postal code to match each rm to the district in which its headquarters is located.
After dropping rms based in districts for which we lack data on wartime destruction we are
left with data on 19;420 rms which have at least one subsidiary or branch in West Germany
outside of the district of their headquarters. As a simple measure of rms' investment activity in
dierent parts of the world, we created a dummy variable for whether the rm has a subsidiary
or branch in a given location x (S. & B. in x (Dummy)). We calculated this dummy variable
for `East Germany', `Poland', the `Old EU Countries' (the 14 EU member countries other than
Germany prior to enlargement in 2004), the `New EU Countries (excluding Poland)' (all EU
member countries that acceded in or after 2004), and for `Non-EU Countries'. For the same set
of rms we computed the share of each rm's subsidiaries and branches in location x as a fraction
of its total number of subsidiaries and branches in location x and West Germany (Share of Total
S. & B. in x). As proxy for the size of the rm we use the log of the number of subsidiaries and
branches it operates in West Germany (S. & B. in West Germany). Finally, we used the NACE
code given in the ORBIS dataset to dene four sectoral xed eects (agriculture, manufacturing,
services, and government).
3.3 Household-Level Data
Our household-level data is from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is an annual
panel of German households. From the panel we selected all households which participated in
the 1985, 1989, and 1995 waves. For each of these households we use information on household
income in the years 1985-2001 (Income (SOEP)) and information on 29 other socio-economic
characteristics of the household, including age, education, occupation and social status of the
household head as well as the composition of household income, transfers to and from relatives,
and asset holdings. We also created a dummy variable which is one if any household member
has lived in East Germany prior to 1961 (Lived in East Germany).20
Importantly, the 1991 wave of the panel contains several questions about contacts to friends
and family in East Germany. Since the survey was conducted in the second year after the fall of
the Berlin Wall and households had some time to renew ties with individuals in the other part
of Germany, we choose not to rely on information about the intensity of contact to friends and
relatives, although it is available.21 Instead, we base our work on the response to the simple
factual question \Do you have relatives in East Germany?" and generate a dummy variable that
20Details of how we aggregated data on individuals to the household level are given in Appendix Table 1.
21Our results are very similar if we use information on friendships or condition on respondents indicating `close'
ties to their relatives or friends.
12is one if at least one member of the household responded with `yes' and zero otherwise (Ties
to Relatives '91). We also aggregated this variable to the region level by calculating the share
of households with ties to East Germany in each West German region (Share Ties to Relatives
'91), which we use as a secondary measure of the intensity of social ties at the regional level. A
possible source of measurement error is that West German relatives of the survey respondents
may have migrated to East Germany directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and before the
conclusion of the 1991 wave of the survey. However, the ow of migrants from West to East in
1990 was small (only around 30,000 individuals, Hunt (2006)). It is thus safe to assume that
households which were based in West Germany in 1989 and report a relative in East Germany
in 1991 also had a relative in East Germany in 1989.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents the data on West German regions; column 1 gives the data for all
regions, columns 2 and 3 divide the sample into regions with a higher and lower share of housing
destroyed in 1946 than the median region. The rst row of column 1 gives the mean and the
standard deviation of the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961. Expellees via the Soviet
sector made up 4.8% of the 1961 population of the average region. Similarly, expellees that came
directly to West Germany made up 11.9% of the average region's population in 1961 (row 2),
and 22.3% of the population report having relatives in East Germany in 1991 (row 3). In all
three cases, these shares are higher in regions that suered lower levels of wartime destruction.
The variation in wartime destruction is considerable, with 15.4% of housing on average destroyed
in regions with low destruction and 49.3% in regions with high destruction (row 4). Moreover,
regions which are closer to the inner-German border tended to be less destroyed than those that
are further away (row 6). The pattern in income per capita is interesting: while regions with
lower wartime destruction are slightly poorer in 1985 and 1989, they are slightly richer than the
average region in 1995.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the data on West German rms in 2007, again split up by regions
with above and below the median level of wartime destruction. On average, rms in regions with
lower wartime destruction are slightly smaller as measured by the number of subsidiaries they
operate in West Germany (row 1). Nevertheless they are also more likely to operate a subsidiary
or branch in the East (8.3% versus 7.2%). On average, 7.7% of the rms in our sample operate
a subsidiary or a branch in East Germany (row 3) and 1.8% operate in non-EU countries.
134 Social Ties and Regional Economic Growth
We rst explore the eect of social ties between West and East Germans on income growth in
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where yr;t is income per capita in region r in year t, t 2 f1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001g.
The left hand side variable is thus the growth in income per capita between 1989 and subsequent
census years. sr;1989 denotes our measure of social ties in region r. Zr is a vector of controls, which
always contains a constant term, a complete set of state xed eects, and the distance between
region r and the inner-German border. The coecient of interest is , which measures the eect
of social ties on growth in income per capita after 1989. In all specications we control for income
per capita in 1989. The coecient  thus measures the degree of mean reversion in income per
capita between West German regions. In our standard specication we also control for the pre
existing growth trend by including the growth rate of income per capita between 1985 and 1989,
log(yr;1989=yr;1985). In our standard specication the coecient  thus estimates the dierential
change in the growth rate of income per capita after 1989 for regions with dierent intensities
of social ties to the East. The assumption that the relationship between growth in income per
capita and social ties is linear is made for simplicity. The error term "r captures all omitted
inuences, including any deviations from linearity. Throughout, standard errors are calculated
using the Huber-White correction to ensure robustness against arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Equation (1) will consistently estimate the parameter of interest if Cov (sr;1989;"r) = 0. This
covariance restriction may however not hold in the data, since the settlement of migrants from the
East in West Germany prior to 1961 (and thus the strength of social ties to East Germany) may
be correlated with dierences in growth prospects across regions. Although we show ordinary
least squares estimates of equation (1) for reference and comparison, we primarily rely on an
instrumental variables strategy, which uses only the variation in sr;1989 that is attributable to
variation in wartime destruction across regions in 1946. Our rst stage specication is
sr;1989 = wr + 
fs logyr;1989 + Z
0
r
fs + r; (2)
where wr is our measure of wartime destruction and (2) contains the same covariates as (1). Our
key identifying assumption is that Cov (wr;"r) = 0. It states that, conditional on the covariates
we control for, (i) wartime destruction in 1946 has no eect on changes in the growth rate of
14income per capita after 1989 other than through its eect on the settlement of migrants who have
social ties to the East and (ii) there is no omitted variable which drives both wartime destruction
and dierential changes in income growth post 1989.
4.1 The First Stage Relationship
Panel A of Table 2 shows our basic rst stage regressions, using the share of expellees via the
Soviet sector in 1961 as a proxy for social ties in 1989. Column 1 is the most parsimonious
specication as shown in equation (2). It regresses the share of expellees via the Soviet sector on
the share of housing destroyed in 1946, while controlling for the distance to the inner-German
border, for income per capita in 1989, and for state xed eects. The coecient estimate of
-0.019 (s.e.= 0.004) is statistically signicant at the 1% level and suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in the share of housing destroyed in 1945 (s.d.= 0.21) is associated with a 0.4
percentage point drop in the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961. (This corresponds
to 8% fewer expellees via the Soviet sector relative to the mean share of expellees via the Soviet
sector across regions.)22
As expected, the share of expellees in 1961 falls with the distance to the inner-German border.
The coecient on income in 1989 is positive and signicant, suggesting that expellees tended to
settle in regions that were richer in 1989, which is most likely attributable to persistent dierences
in income per capita between regions which existed prior to 1961.23
The specication in column 2 is our standard specication. It adds income growth in the
ve years prior to 1989 as an additional control. The coecient of interest remains virtually
unchanged at -0.020 (s.e.= 0.005). The coecient on income growth is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, suggesting that the pattern of settlement of expellees via the Soviet sector
in 1961 is not correlated with income growth in the years prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Appendix Figure 2 plots the conditional relationship estimated in this column and shows
that the rst stage relationship is not driven by outliers. Columns 3-6 of Panel A of Table
2 show the rst stage regressions corresponding to robustness checks which we perform in the
instrumental variables estimation. In column 3 we use the volume of rubble per capita in 1946
as an alternative measure of wartime destruction, which again yields a negative and signicant
22The share of expellees via the Soviet sector proxies for both groups of migrants (expellees and refugees)
arriving from East Germany. Since both groups were roughly of the same size we may speculate that a one
standard deviation increase in wartime destruction may be associated with a drop in the total share of migrants
from the East settling in a given West German region which is around twice as large.
23Income per capita in 1989 is included in all specications to present the rst stage corresponding to the
instrumental variables results discussed below. If we drop all controls from the regression, the estimated coecient
is identical, -0.019, s.e.=0.007.
15coecient. In column 4 we replace our control for the distance to the inner-German border
with a xed eect for each distance quartile and in column 5 we add the share of the workforce
employed in agriculture, manufacturing, services, and government in 1989 (we do not report the
coecients on these variables to save space). Finally, column 6 adds the extent of migration after
reunication as an additional control. In each case the coecient of interest remains virtually
unchanged and statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Panel B of Table 2 repeats the same specications as in Panel A, using the share of households
with ties to relatives in East Germany in 1991 as an alternative proxy for social ties in 1989.
In the interest of preserving space we show only the coecient of interest. All estimates are
negative and all except the ones in columns 3 and 4 are statistically signicant at the 5% level
(the latter is signicant at 10%). The coecient in column 1 is -0.099 (s.e.= 0.042). It implies
that a one standard deviation rise in the share of housing destroyed in 1945 is associated with a
2.08 percentage point drop (or alternatively a 9.3% drop relative to the average) in the share of
respondents that have a relative in East Germany in 1991. Similar results (not shown) hold for
the share of respondents that report contact with friends in East Germany.
In the remainder of the paper we use the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961 as
our main proxy for social ties, as it lays bare the historical source of the variation and claries
possible alternative interpretations of our results. Since it comes from a comprehensive census,
we also expect it to be measured with less error than a variable generated from a panel survey
of only 1911 individuals. Needless to say, the correlation between the two proxies is very high
(64%), as shown in Appendix Figure 3, and results are very similar when we use either of the
two proxies.
4.2 The Reduced Form Relationship
As a prelude to our instrumental variables estimates, Panel C shows the reduced form relationship
between growth in income per capita after the fall of the Berlin Wall and wartime destruction.
All specications (except the one in column 3) are again identical to the ones in Panels A and






. The coecient of interest is negative and statistically signicant at the 5%
level in all columns except in column 1, where it is signicant at the 10% level. The estimate
in column 2 (-0.048, s.e.= 0.020), suggests that regions which were least destroyed during the
war experienced a signicantly higher increase in the growth rate of income per capita post 1989
than regions which were most destroyed during the war. A one standard deviation drop in the
16share of housing destroyed in 1946 is associated with a 1.5 percentage point higher growth in
income per capita over the six years following German reunication. The size of the estimated
coecient is stable across columns 1, 2 and 4-6, with point estimates ranging from -0.042 in
column 1 to -0.052 in column 4. Appendix Figure 4 depicts this relationship graphically in a
conditional scatter plot, where the slope shown corresponds to the estimate in column 2.24
As a rst test of the mechanism by which wartime destruction could suddenly aect economic
growth 45 years after the fact, the specication in column 3 includes both the share of housing
destroyed in 1946 and rubble per capita in 1946. The results are encouraging for our identication
strategy: while the coecient on the share of housing destroyed remains negative and signicant
at -0.060 (s.e.= 0.027), the coecient on rubble per capita is positive and insignicant. This
pattern is consistent with the view that it is primarily the lack of housing in 1946 and not wartime
destruction per se that aects changes in economic growth post 1989.
4.3 Instrumental Variables Results
In our instrumental variables estimation we explicitly test the hypothesis that a concentration of
households with social ties to East Germany in 1989 in a given West German region is causally
related to a rise in the growth rate of income per capita after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In
Table 3, we estimate (1) using only the variation in social ties in 1989 that is due to variation in
wartime destruction by instrumenting for the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961. In
column 1 we instrument with the share of housing destroyed in 1946.25 The coecient estimate
on the share of expellees is 2.169 (s.e.= 0.947), suggesting that a one standard deviation increase
in the share of expellees in 1961 (s.d.= 0.019) is associated with a 4.3 percentage point rise in
income per capita over the six years following 1989 (or roughly a 0.7 percentage point higher
growth rate per annum).26 The coecient on income in the base year, 1989, is negative and
signicant, which suggests mean reversion in income per capita across West German regions.
Somewhat surprisingly, the coecient on the distance to the inner-German border is positive,
24In the plot, Wilhelmshaven looks like a signicant outlier. Dropping Wilhelmshaven from the sample reduces
the coecient estimate to -0.033 (s.e. = 0.016). As a more systematic check for the eect of outliers, we run a
robust regression (according to the terminology used by STATA) in which observations with a Cook's D value
of more than one are dropped and weights are iteratively calculated based on the residuals of a weighted least
squares regression. The robust estimate is -0.032 (s.e. = 0.014).
25The F-statistic against the null that the excluded instrument is irrelevant in the rst-stage regression is 22.56
(this is the squared t-statistic from the corresponding specication in Table 2).
26Since our model contains a lagged dependent variable there may be a mechanical bias in the coecient of
interest. Instrumenting the lagged dependent variable with its own lag ensures consistency (Anderson and Hsiao
(1982)). If we use income in 1985 as instrument for income in 1989 the coecient estimate increases slightly to
2.289 (s.e.=0:984) and remains signicant at the 5% level.
17which suggests that the regions closest to the inner-German border did not immediately prot
from the opening of the border (which is in line with a similar observation in Redding and
Sturm (2008) that the population of West German cities close to the inner-German border grew
relatively little between 1989 and 2002).
Column 3 gives our standard specication in which we control both for the level of income
in 1989 and for income growth in the four years preceding 1989. The coecient of interest rises
slightly to 2.442 (s.e.= 0:880) and is now signicant at the 1% level.27 The fact that we control
for both the pre-existing income level and for pre-1989 income growth means that this estimate
is specic to the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall: it can neither be explained by mean
reversion in income growth nor by a pre existing trend.
The results of column 3 are almost unchanged when we simultaneously instrument the share of
expellees with both the share of housing destroyed and with rubble per capita (shown in column
4). Column 2 shows the OLS estimate of our standard specication for comparison. It is only
about one half of a standard error lower at 1.963 (s.e.= 0.574), suggesting that the endogenous
assignment of expellees to West German regions induces only a relatively mild downward bias in
the OLS estimate. A Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis that Cov (sr;1989;"r) = 0.
4.4 Validity of the Exclusion Restriction
While the endogenous assignment of migrants from the East to West German regions does not
seem to have a large impact on our results, our identifying assumption, that the degree of
wartime destruction in 1946 aected changes in the growth rate of income per capita after 1989
only through its eect on the settlement of migrants who have social ties to the East, cannot
be tested directly. Nevertheless, we can perform a number of falsication exercises to assess its
plausibility. There are two types of potential challenges and corresponding tests.
Simple Challenge The `simple' challenge to our identifying assumption is that wartime de-
struction (or an omitted variable driving it) may have had a lasting eect on income growth in
West German regions which persisted for more than half a century (until 1995). We believe that
we can convincingly discard this `simple' challenge.
First, our standard specication controls for the growth rate of income pre 1989 and thus
identies changes in the growth rate of income per capita that occur after 1989.
27We do not cluster the standard errors at the state level as there are only 10 states (our sample excludes
Berlin).
18Second, we can show that growth in income per capita in the four years prior to 1989 is uncor-
related with wartime destruction and with the settlement of expellees. Panel B of Table 3 shows
a placebo experiment in which we use income growth between 1985 and 1989 as the dependent
variable rather than as a control. All specications are parallel to those in Panel A (except that
we now control for log income per capita in 1985 rather than in 1989). Throughout the panel
the coecient of interest is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Wartime destruction thus
becomes relevant for economic growth only post 1989. In Appendix Table 2 we pinpoint the
timing of the eect at a higher frequency by regressing log income per capita for each region and
year post 1985 on the interaction of year xed eects with the share of expellees in 1961 (again
instrumented with wartime destruction). The table shows no eect of the settlement of expellees
on income growth rates prior to 1989, a positive eect in all years post 1989 and a statistically
signicant eect on growth between 1989 and 1993 and later years. The timing of the eect
is thus highly supportive of the view that variation in the degree of wartime destruction only
became relevant after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Third, while we have no data on regional income per capita prior to 1985, it is a well doc-
umented fact that wartime destruction had no impact on population growth in West German
cities post 1960 (Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004)). In Figure 1 we replicate part
of this result. The gure depicts coecient estimates from city-level regressions of population
growth in the years between 1929 and 2000 on the share of housing destroyed in 1946 and a
constant. Not surprisingly, wartime destruction had a strong and signicantly negative eect on
population growth during the war (between 1939 and 1945). During the period of reconstruc-
tion between 1946 and 1960 the cities most heavily destroyed grew fastest. However, from 1960
onwards there is no statistically signicant eect of wartime destruction on population growth
and the coecient estimates are virtually zero. To the extent that population growth proxies
for income growth, this result suggests that the direct eects of wartime destruction on income
growth were short-lasting.28
Sophisticated Challenge The `sophisticated' challenge to our identifying assumption is that
the pattern of wartime destruction (or some omitted variable driving it) may have aected income
growth through some other channel which only `switched on' post 1989.
For example, the allies may have targeted areas which were focused on manufacturing and
the manufacturing sector may have experienced a relative decline after 1989. To address this po-
tential concern, we regress seven region characteristics in 1989, including the average educational
28See Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) for a discussion of the microeconomic eects of wartime destruction in Germany.
19attainment, the share of the population who are entrepreneurs, the unemployment rate, and the
sectoral composition of the workforce on the share of housing destroyed in 1946 and our stan-
dard region-level controls. The results in Appendix Table 4a show that the pattern of wartime
destruction is not signicantly correlated with any of these observable region characteristics.29
In line with these results, the coecient of interest changes only marginally when we control
for the sectoral composition of the workforce in Table 3 column 6. In particular, the estimated
coecient on the share of the workforce employed in manufacturing is negative, but it is not
statistically signicant. Any variation in income growth post 1989 due to a relative decline of
the manufacturing sector is thus unrelated to the variation in income growth due to the eect of
wartime destruction on the settlement of migrants from the East pre 1961.
Another potential concern is that after 1989 highly skilled workers from East Germany may
have migrated to the same regions in which their relatives settled before 1961, and that this
migration may have increased the average wage paid in these regions. In column 7 we control
for the ow of migration from East to West post 1989, and again there is little eect on the
coecient of interest.30
While neither of these observable region characteristics appear to be driving our results, there
might be other (unobservable) omitted variables which may be correlated with the pattern of
wartime destruction and aect changes in regional growth trajectories post 1989. Alternatively,
we may be misinterpreting our results in that migrants from the East may aect changes in
income growth post 1989 through some channel other than social ties. In particular, they might
have been somehow dierent from other Germans, and these dierent traits may have put them
in a position to earn higher incomes post 1989 for reasons unrelated to social ties to the East.31
We are able to provide evidence on this, and the entire class of `sophisticated' challenges, by
comparing the eects of expellees via the Soviet sector with the eects of expellees who arrived
directly from the parts of pre-war Germany that were annexed by Poland and Russia. Appendix
Table 4b shows that, conditional on our standard control variables, there are no systematic
dierences in 1989 between the regions in which the two groups settle in terms of observable
29Each line of the table corresponds to one regression. It reports the dependent variable, the coecient on
Share Housing Destroyed '46, as well as the p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis that the coecient is
equal to zero. We cannot reject this hypothesis at the 5% level in any of the seven specications.
30When we use the ow of migration from East Germany post 1989 as the dependent variable, the coecient
on expellees via the Soviet sector is not signicant, which is comforting for the interpretation of our results. A
related result in the literature is that high-skilled workers from the East were actually less likely to migrate to
the West than low-skilled workers until 1996 (Fuchs-Sch undeln and Sch undeln (2009)).
31In fact, the 1971 census, the last census in which expellees are separately identied, would suggest the
opposite. It shows that both groups of expellees are slightly poorer, slightly less educated, and signicantly less
likely to be entrepreneurs than `native' West Germans. See Appendix Table 3.
20characteristics. The only exception is that regions with a larger share of direct expellees tend
to have a marginally larger share of their workforce employed in the agricultural sector.32 (We
therefore control for the employment share in agriculture and the employment shares of the
three other sectors in the specications discussed below.) Conditional on this caveat, it seems
that the only relevant dierence between the two groups is that expellees who arrived directly
from the annexed areas did not spend any signicant time living (and forming social ties) in
East Germany. If we misinterpret our results and the eects we document are driven by some
omitted variable which determined both wartime destruction and changes in post 1989 income
growth, or if there was something special about expellees per se that gave them access to business
opportunities post 1989, we would expect to nd that both groups of expellees have an identical
eect on income growth post 1989.
In Table 4 we relate growth in income per capita post 1989 simultaneously to the share of
expellees via the Soviet sector and to the share of direct expellees, again conditional on our
standard region-level controls (not shown). Column 1 gives the results from an OLS regression.
While the coecient on expellees via the Soviet Sector is positive, statistically signicant at the
1% level, and very similar to the estimates from Table 3 (2.131, s.e.=0.706), the coecient on the
share of direct expellees is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In columns 2
and 3 we add additional controls for the share of the population employed in agriculture (column
2) and for the share of the population employed in the other three sectors (column 3). Both
make little dierence to the results.
In columns 4-6 we repeat this exercise using our instrumental variables strategy. To compare
the causal eect of direct expellees and expellees via the Soviet sector on income growth post
1989 we require two instruments which give us dierential leverage in identifying the exogenous
components in the settlement patterns of both groups. In Panels B and C we re-run our standard
rst stage regression from Table 2 column 2, but include both the share of housing destroyed and
the volume of rubble per capita in 1946. (We again do not report covariates in the interest of
space.) Panel B gives the results for expellees arriving via the Soviet sector and Panel C gives the
results for direct expellees. In the case of the former, the share of housing destroyed is signicant
with a negative sign and rubble is insignicant across all three specications. In the case of the
latter, the size of the eect of the share of housing destroyed is roughly preserved, though it is
32Appendix Table 4b reports regressions of seven region characteristics in 1989 on the share of both groups of
expellees in 1961 and our standard region-level controls (distance to east, income in 1989, income growth between
1985 and 1989, and state xed eects). Each line of the table corresponds to one regression. It reports the
dependent variable, the coecients on the two groups of expellees, as well as the p-value corresponding to the
null hypothesis that the two coecients are equal. We cannot reject this hypothesis at the 5% level in any of the
seven specications.
21less precisely estimated. Importantly for us, the coecient on the amount of rubble is negative
and signicant. Our two measures of wartime destruction thus give us dierential leverage in
identifying the exogenous components in the settlement patterns of both groups.33 34
Using both instruments, we are thus able to separately estimate the causal eects of expellees
via the Soviet sector and of direct expellees on dierential income growth after 1989. Columns
1-3 of Panel A present the results. While the coecient on the share of expellees via the Soviet
sector is again positive, similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained earlier (3.422, s.e.= 1.809
in column 1), and statistically signicant at the 10% level, the coecient on the share of direct
expellees is close to zero and statistically insignicant.35 The growth eects we document are
thus particular to the group which had the opportunity to form social ties to East Germans
before moving to the West. We view this result as strong support in favor of our interpretation.
4.5 Remaining Caveats
A remaining concern with the interpretation of our results is that migrants arriving from East
Germany may have had an unobservable emotional anity to the East that direct expellees did
not share. Such an emotional anity may have prompted them to accept lower expected returns
when investing in the East and, by pure chance, realized returns may have been so much higher
than expected that they resulted in a rise in income per capita at the regional level. Conceptually,
we cannot rule out this possibility. However, the idea that realized returns of investing in the
East were a large positive surprise would be grossly at odds with the dominant narrative that
economic performance of the East post reunication was a signicant disappointment (see for
example Paque (2009)).36
A nal concern for which we cannot control explicitly at the regional level is that expellees
33The Kleibergen-Paap rank test allows us to formally test whether the two instruments induce sucient
dierential variation in the endogenous variables. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 3.95. Hence, we reject the
null that the matrix of reduced form coecients is underidentied at the 5% level.
34This feature of the data may be related to the timing of the arrival of the two groups of expellees. The
direct expellees arrived immediately after the war, whereas the expellees via the Soviet sector arrived between
1945 and 1961. We therefore suspect that rubble per capita measures a dimension of wartime damage which was
more important in the immediate aftermath of the war but was then cleared away relatively quickly, while the
destruction of the housing stock had longer-lasting eects.
35The two coecients are statistically signicantly dierent in the specication shown in column 1 (p-value:
0.008). In the instrumental variable specication of column 4 the p-value is 0.117.
36Relatedly, some of the patterns we document may be explained if migrants from the East had permanently
dierent consumption preferences than `native' West Germans and if these preferences were more similar to the
consumption preferences of East Germans post reunication (Atkin (2009) documents such long-lasting dierences
in preferences for India). However, we have found no mention of such dierences in the literature on inner-
German migration, and the literature on German Reunication actually suggests the opposite: that East Germans
immediately abandoned East German consumption brands in favor of West German brands (Sinn and Sinn
(1992)). In line with this view, East and West German CPI are today calculated using identical weights.
22via the Soviet sector might be more likely than `native' West Germans to have restitution claims
to property expropriated in East Germany. Under the reunication treaty, former owners of
assets located in East Germany could apply for restitution or compensation providing that they
had not received compensation from the East German government and that the assets they were
claiming still existed at the time of ling. This meant that practically all individual claims led
related to real estate and/or rms. While compensation payments by law did not begin until
1996 (Southern (1993)), the restitution of assets began in the early 1990s and could potentially
confound our measure of income per capita. However, we can be condent that any bias they
may induce in our estimates is quantitatively small.37
First, the Mikrozensus asks about household income in a usual month and respondents select
an income bracket (with the highest category being DM 7000 in 1995), so that one-time inows
of cash have no impact on our measure of income per capita. The only potential concern for
our results is therefore any ow income that may be generated by restituted assets (or by assets
purchased from proceeds of sales of restituted assets).
Second, the volume of restitutions was orders of magnitude smaller than the eect on income
per capita we document above. For example, the average East German rental unit generated a
monthly cash ow of DM 240 in 1995.38 If we estimate that about 300,000 apartments and houses
were returned to former West German owners by 199539 and made the extreme assumption that
all of these units went to expellees via the Soviet sector, the average expellee would experience
a rise in her monthly income of DM 240
300;000
2;800;000 = DM 25:71. A one standard deviation increase
in the share of expellees (0.019) would then be associated with a rise in income per capita at the
regional level of DM 0.49 (or 0.03%). Similarly, a reasonable estimate of the total value of the
1,571 rms restituted to their former owners by 1994 is DM 9.7bn.40 If we again made the extreme
assumption that all of these rms were restituted to expellees via the Soviet sector, and that they
37According to the government agency handling restitutions, half of all approved claims were settled by com-
pensation payments, and the total sum of compensation payments made between 1996 and 2009 was EUR 1.4
bn. (Personal correspondence with Dr. H andler, press liaison of the Bundesamt f ur zentrale Dienste und oene
Verm ogensfragen.)
38Average rent paid in East Germany per month in 1995 excluding utilities is DM 437 (DIW (1996)). According
to a survey of large operators of rental apartments and houses (GdW (1994)), maintenance and renovations
accounted for 45% of rental revenues in 1993 such that we may estimate the cash ow per unit as (:55) 437 = 240:
39Hubert and Tomann (1993) estimate that a maximum of 1,3m apartments and houses were aected by
restitution claims. Approximately 60% of all restitution claims were made by West Germans (Thimann, 1996, p.
147). By the end of 1993, 20% of rental properties which had been claimed by former owners had been restituted
GdW (1994).
40The Treuhandanstalt, the government body administering the privatization of East German rms, generated
a total of DM 60bn in revenues from the sale and liquidation of 10,428 rms (or DM 6.2m per rm). Assuming
that the 1,571 restituted rms had the same average value and that they were returned to their former owners
for free, the total value of rm restitutions amounts to DM 9.7bn (Lange and Pugh, 1998, p. 73).
23immediately generated an annual cash ow of 10% (which they almost certainly did not as the
average recipient of a rm had a contractual obligation to make investments amounting to two
times the estimated rm value in the ve years following privatization (Lange and Pugh, 1998,




DM 28:87: A one standard deviation increase in the share of expellees would then be associated
with a rise in income per capita of a mere 0.03%. The volume of restitutions made before 1995
was therefore orders of magnitude too small to induce a meaningful bias in our estimates.
5 Understanding the Eect on Regional Economic Growth
5.1 Entrepreneurial Activity
In an eort to shed light on the channel linking social ties to regional economic growth, we
disaggregate regional income per capita into the average income of households whose primary
income derives from entrepreneurial activity (entrepreneurs) and the average income of all other
households (non-entrepreneurs).41 In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we re-run our standard speci-
cation from column 3 in Table 3 with the growth rate in the average income of entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs as dependent variables. Both specications include the same covariates
as our standard specication, but add the (log of the) average income of entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs in 1989, respectively, as an additional control. Since the errors in the specications
in columns 1 and 2 are likely to be correlated, we estimate the two equations (as well as their
rst stage) jointly using the three stage least squares estimator. The coecient estimate is 4.516
(s.e.= 1:668) for entrepreneurs (column 1) and 1.491 (s.e.= 0:676) for non-entrepreneurs (column
2), implying that a one standard deviation rise in the share of expellees via the Soviet sector is
associated with a 8.6% rise in the average income of entrepreneurs, but only a 2.8% rise in the av-
erage income of non-entrepreneurs.42 Entrepreneurs who lived in a region with strong social ties
to the East thus experienced a much steeper rise in their average income than non-entrepreneurs
living in the same region.
This strong eect on the income of entrepreneurs is mirrored by an increase in the number
of entrepreneurs. In column 3 we re-run our standard specication but use the share of the
population who are entrepreneurs in 1995 as the dependent variable, where we again add the
share of the population who are entrepreneurs in 1989 as an additional control. The coecient
41In the German Mikrozensus these are households whose household heads declare that their primary occupation
is Selbstst andiger mit oder ohne Besch aftigte.
42The p-value on the null hypothesis that the two coecients on Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 are equal
in columns 1 and 2 is 0:070.
24of interest is 0.322 (s.e.=0.163), implying that a one standard-deviation rise in the share of
expellees (0.019) induces a 0.61 percentage point rise in the share of the population engaged in
entrepreneurial activities. This is a sizable eect, corresponding to a 14.2% rise relative to the
mean share of entrepreneurs in 1989 (0.043).
5.2 Firm Investment
The signicant rise in entrepreneurial income in regions with strong social ties to the East suggests
that rms which were based in these regions generated higher prots in the years following the
fall of the Berlin Wall. One possible reason for such a rise in protability is that locating in
a region with strong social ties to the East may have generated a comparative advantage in
investing in the East. Firms who had access to a workforce or to an owner with social ties to
the East may have been in a better position to assess the value of East German rms that came
up for sale or may have been better able to gauge local demand for products and services. We
explore this possibility by examining the holdings of subsidiaries and branches of West German
rms in East Germany.
We have data on 19,402 rms whose headquarters are located in West Germany. For these
rms we calculate a dummy variable which is one if the rm operates a subsidiary or branch
in East Germany and zero otherwise. Since West German rms could not own assets in East
Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, any subsidiaries or branches that they operate in
2007 must have been acquired after 1989. Our dummy variable is thus informative both about
the investment behavior of West German rms in East Germany since 1989 and about a possible
long-lasting eect of social ties in 1989 on the economic structure of West Germany.
The structural equation of interest is
bkdr;2007 = 
fsdr;1989 + 






where bkdr;2007 stands for the dummy indicating whether rm k in West German district d and
region r operates a subsidiary or a branch in East Germany in 2007. sdr;1989 is again our proxy
of social ties between the residents of district d in region r and East Germany in 1989; yr;1989
stands for income per capita in region r in 1989; and Zkdr is a vector of rm and district-level
controls which contains a complete set of state xed eects, a xed eect for the sector in which
the rm has its primary operations, the log of the number of subsidiaries and branches that rm
k operates in West Germany, and the distance between district d and the inner-German border.
(Note that income per capita in 1989 is available only at the regional level and not at the district
25level.)
The coecient of interest is 
f which measures the eect of the intensity of social ties to
the East in a given West German district in 1989 on the probability that a rm headquartered
within that district operates a subsidiary or branch in East Germany in 2007. As in section 4, we
account for the possibility that our measure of social ties (the share of expellees via the Soviet
sector settling in a West German region in 1961) is jointly determined with income growth
by instrumenting sdr;1989 with the share of housing destroyed in 1946. The rst stage of our
instrumental variables strategy is thus the analog to (2). We cluster all standard errors at the
district level to account for likely spatial correlation.43
Panel A of Table 6 shows reduced form estimates, relating the share of housing destroyed in
1946 directly to the probability that a given rm operates a subsidiary or branch in East Germany
in 2007. In column 1, we regress our dummy variable on the share of housing destroyed in the
district and the log of the number of subsidiaries and branches that the rm operates in West
Germany in 2007, which we use as a simple control for the size of the rm.44 The coecient of
interest is -0.030 (s.e.=0.011) and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The estimate implies
that a one standard deviation rise in the share of housing destroyed (0.24) within a given West
German district is associated with a 0.7 percentage point drop in the probability that a rm based
in that district operates a subsidiary or branch in East Germany in 2007. Unsurprisingly, the
coecient on our size control is positive and signicant, reecting the fact that larger rms are
also more likely to operate in East Germany. Columns 2-5 add all of the now familiar district- and
region-level covariates from section 4, and column 2 gives the analog of our standard specication.
Throughout, the coecient of interest remains in a tight range between -0.026 and -0.031 and is
statistically signicant at the 1% or 5% level.
Panel B shows our instrumental variables estimates of equation (3), which use the variation
in wartime destruction to quantify the causal eect of social ties in 1989 on the investment
behavior of West German rms. All specications contain the same covariates as those in Panel
A. The estimates in all columns are positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level. The
estimate from our standard specication in column 2 is 1.497 (s.e.= 0.664), which implies that a
one standard deviation rise in the share of expellees via Soviet sector in a West German district
(0:022) is associated with a 3.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a rm based in
that district will operate a subsidiary or a branch in East Germany in 2007.
43We use a simple linear probability model, since this allows for a straight-forward interpretation of the coe-
cient.
44The raw correlation between our dummy variable and the share of housing destroyed is -0.019 (s.e.=0.012)
and statistically signicant at the 10% level.
26The remaining panels of Table 6 show the results of a number of falsication exercises. If
the pattern in holdings of subsidiaries and branches prevailing in 2007 is truly attributable to
variation in social ties to East Germany in 1989, and not to some other factor, our measure of
social ties to East Germany should predict investment in East Germany but not in other areas
of the world.45 Panels C-F repeat the same specications as in Panel B, but with a dummy
variable indicating whether a rm operates subsidiaries or branches in Poland, in the `old' EU
countries (the 14 member countries other than Germany prior to the enlargement in 2004), in
the `new' EU countries (the 9 countries, other than Poland, which joined the EU in 2004), and
in non-EU countries as the dependent variable. As expected, all estimated coecients in Panels
D, E and F are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Firms which are based in districts with
a high share of expellees via the Soviet sector are thus not more likely to operate subsidiaries or
branches in areas other than East Germany. Interestingly, however, the only exception from this
rule is that the estimates for Poland are positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level in all
columns. The estimated eect for Poland is about 1/5th the size of the eect estimated for East
Germany. Since the largest group of expellees who settled in West Germany after 1945 actually
came from areas that are today part of Poland, these results suggest a possible additional eect
of social ties to Poland on the investment behavior of West German rms. (Although the size of
the coecient for Poland is similar to that of some of the other, insignicant coecients.)46
In Appendix Table 6 we explore whether social ties may have been especially relevant in
determining the investment behavior of rms in any particular sector. To this end we return to
the standard specication of our rm-level analysis (Table 6, Panel B, column 2) and interact
the share of expellees via the Soviet sector with each of the four sectoral xed eects included
in the specication (and instrument each interaction with the interactions of the sectoral xed
eects with the share of housing destroyed in 1946). The estimated eects in the agriculture,
government, and manufacturing sectors are statistically insignicant, while the eect estimated
for the services sector is positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level (2.142, s.e.= 0:993).
We may interpret this as evidence that social ties were particularly important for rm investment
in the services sector, which is arguably the sector of the economy which is most susceptible to
45If rms from districts with a high fraction of expellees were merely good at capitalizing on new business
opportunities, regardless of social ties, we might, for example, expect to see an eect on their holdings in other
Eastern European countries following consecutive rounds of EU enlargement.
46Appendix Table 5 reports the outcomes of additional robustness checks, in which we repeat the same speci-
cations as in Panels A and B of Table 6, but now use the share of each rm's subsidiaries and branches operated
in East Germany as the dependent variable. The results are again similar, indicating that rms which are head-
quartered in West German districts that have strong social ties to East Germany in 1989 also operate a larger
share of their subsidiaries and branches in East Germany in 2007.
27informational asymmetries and reliant on knowledge of local demand. However, most of the rms
in our sample have their primary focus in this sector such that we interpret this result with due
caution.47
5.3 Social Ties and Household Income
If the presence of households who have social ties to East Germany encourages local rms to
invest in the East and has benecial eects on income growth at the regional level, we would
expect these households to internalize at least part of the gain which they generate at the regional
level. In this section we explore how individual households may have beneted from their social
ties to East Germany using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). From the
panel we select households which were located in West Germany in 1989 and participated in the
1985 and 1995 waves of the survey.
Panel C of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the entire panel of 1911 households, and
for the subsets of households which report and do not report ties to relatives in East Germany.
The households with ties to East Germany had slightly lower income in 1989 (DM 3219 versus
DM 3491 per month) and their household heads tended to have slightly less education (on
average 12.12 years versus 12.42 years). However, the two subsets of households look similar on
other observable dimensions such as the amount of capital income, the share of household heads
engaged in entrepreneurial activity, and the share unemployed.
Our basic household-level regression estimates the eect of social ties to East Germany on
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where yi;t is the income of household i in year t, Ti is a dummy variable indicating ties to
East Germany and Zi is a vector of controls which contains a full set of region xed eects,
household income growth between 1985 and 1989, as well as the gender, age and age squared
of the household head. The coecient of interest is 
hh, which estimates the eect of ties to
relatives in East Germany on dierential growth in household income after 1989.
Before estimating (4), Table 7 establishes the consistency of our household-level and region-
level datasets. Column 1 reproduces the standard specication from Table 3 column 3, which
relates region-level income growth to the share of expellees via the Soviet sector, regional average
income in 1989, regional average income growth prior to 1989, and the distance of the region to
47Unfortunately it is not possible to further disaggregate the services sector with the data available.
28the inner-German border. In column 2, we regress household-level income growth on the same
region-level covariates, as well as on household-level income in the base year and household-
level income growth between 1985 and 1989. The coecient estimate on share of expellees is
insignicant, but remarkably similar to the one we obtained in the region-level dataset, 2.777
(s.e.= 3.609). The fact that the estimate is statistically insignicant is not surprising as we are
now using a sample of 1911 households, rather than region averages of 1% of the population.
However, it is comforting that both datasets appear to have similar quantitative implications in
this regard.
In column 3 we drop the region-level share of expellees variable and replace it with a
household-level dummy variable indicating ties to East Germany. The estimate is positive and
highly statistically signicant, 0.069 (s.e.= 0.025). In column 4 we add controls for the gender,
age, and age squared of the household head (these are standard controls in the labor literature),
which reduces the coecient of interest to 0.046 (s.e.=0.023). In column 5 we add region xed
eects and estimate the full model in (4). The coecient of interest is 0.049 (s.e.= 0.023).48 It
suggests that households with ties to East Germany in 1989 experienced on average 5 percentage
points higher income growth in the 6 years following the fall of the Berlin Wall than comparable
households who do not have such ties.49
For specication (4) to estimate the coecient of interest consistently we require cov (Ti;"i) =
0. As ties to relatives could not have had an economic benet prior to 1989, we believe this
condition does not fail due to reverse causality. However, it may still fail if households with ties
to the East are also more likely than other households to have some omitted characteristics which
aect their income growth dierently after 1989 than before 1989. For example, we may worry
that individuals with social ties could somehow be more entrepreneurial or better educated, and
therefore better able to seize the economic opportunities that present themselves after the fall
of the Berlin Wall. (However, the summary statistics in Panel C of Table 1 actually suggest the
opposite.)
As a more systematic approach to detecting any omitted variables we select all relevant vari-
ables from the 1989 wave of the SOEP that pertain to education; occupational status; industry
48This coecient estimate is essentially unchanged if we consider only households who have relatives in the
East and report that they are in contact with these relatives or if we consider households who have friends and/or
relatives in the East.
49Since our model contains a lagged dependent variable there may again be a mechanical bias in the coecient
of interest. We cannot perform an Arellano-Bond style estimation as we do not have enough pre-1989 data.
However, if we drop the control for the pre-existing growth trend, we can instrument for household income in
1989 with household income 1985. In this case the coecient of interest is estimated to be 0.038 (s.e.=0.022) and
signicant at the 10% level.
29of employment; professional aliation; union membership; asset holdings; and sources of income
and regress them on our dummy variable indicating Ties to the East as well as our standard
control variables from equation (4). Conditional on these controls, there are no systematic dier-
ences between households with and without ties in 18 of the 20 variables we consider (see panel
A of Appendix Table 7). The only exceptions are that households with ties to the East are less
likely to be civil servants and (correspondingly) less likely to be employed in the government
sector.
In column 2 of Table 8 we add both of these variables as additional covariates to our standard
specication, which we reproduce in column 1 for comparison. (Again, this table only reports
the coecient of interest and the coecients on the variables that are added relative to the
standard specication.) The coecient of interest rises slightly to 0.053 (s.e.=0.023) and remains
statistically signicant at the 5% level. Column 3 adds the household head's years of education
and years of education squared in 1989, both of which remain statistically insignicant. Column
4 introduces a dummy variable for whether the household head is an entrepreneur in 1989. This
variable remains insignicant, and again induces almost no change in the coecient of interest.
While social ties to East Germany may generate signicant economic benets to West German
households post 1989, they may also entail a moral obligation to nancially support these relatives
in the long term. Indeed, households with social ties to the East report paying signicantly
higher transfers to relatives between 1989 and 1995, but do not receive higher transfers from
relatives than comparable other households (see Panel B of Appendix Table 7). Consistent with
this observation, our results remain unchanged when we control for the volume of the transfers
received from relatives between 1990 and 1995 in column 5 of Table 8.50
In Panel B of Table 8 we check the robustness of our results using a restricted sample of
households which excludes all households who may potentially have received restitutions of assets
from the East: It excludes all households who have rental income in 1995 as well as all households
who owned rms in 1995 but not in 1989.51 This reduces the sample size by 17%. In our standard
specication (column 1) the coecient of interest rises slightly to 0.059 (s.e. = 0.027) and remains
statistically signicant at the 5% level. Moreover, the results in the remaining columns are similar
to those from Panel A, albeit with slightly larger standard errors. Our household-level results
are thus robust to excluding the subgroup of households that could plausibly have beneted
from restitutions prior to 1995 and are consistent with the view that the eect of restitutions on
50See Martinez and Yang (2007) for an example in which variation in the transfers paid by migrants to house-
holds in their regions of origin aect economic outcomes at the regional level.
51A total of 57 households in our sample acquired rms between 1989 and 1995, 17 of which had relatives in
East Germany.
30income growth, particularly pre 1995, is economically small.
In Figure 2 we explore the timing of the eect by using the full panel structure of the data in a
specication analogous to Appendix Table 2 column 1. We regress the income of each household
in a given year on its income in 1985, a full set of year and region xed eects, the interaction
of year eects with the dummy variable indicating ties to East Germany in 1991, and controls
from our standard specication (gender, age and age squared). The gure plots the coecients
on the interaction terms, and identies a 95% condence interval.52 Each coecient measures
the dierential income growth of households with social ties to the East between 1985 and the
indicated year. The pattern is striking: the coecients are statistically indistinguishable from
zero until 1989, when they jump up and remain statistically signicant at the 5% level in most
years until 1995. All coecients after 1989 are statistically signicant at the 10% level until the
end of the sample in 2001.
As a nal robustness check we re-estimate our results using a propensity score matching
estimator. We estimate the propensity of treatment by running a probit regression of our dummy
indicating ties to the East on the controls used in Table 8. We then calculate the predicted
probability that each household in our sample has ties to the East and group our observations
into 5 bins corresponding to 20 percentage point probability intervals. In a second step, we
regress the growth of household income between 1989 and 1995 on a full set of xed eects for
each bin and on the interactions between these xed eects and our dummy indicating ties to
the East. We can reject the null that the coecients on these interactions are jointly equal to
zero with a p-value of 0.037. The estimated average treatment eect across bins (weighted by
the probability mass of households in each bin) is 0.634, which is only slightly larger than our
estimates in Table 8.53
5.3.1 Alternative Notions of Anity between Regions
In addition to establishing the econometric robustness of the results the data from the SOEP
allow us to distinguish the eect of social ties on household income from two closely related
notions of anity between regions.
First, me may suspect that individuals who lived in East Germany during their youth retain
knowledge about local economic conditions which enables them to earn rents after reunication
even if they do not have personal contact with East Germans. Social ties would then have no
52The sample size decreases monotonically from 1911 in 1995 to 1419 in 2001.
53If the conditional independence assumption holds, adding controls to this regression should have very little
impact on the result. When we include the controls from Table 8 or the full set of variables from Appendix Table
7 as additional controls the estimated eect changes only very slightly to 0.661 and 0.611, respectively.
31direct eect on household income, but would merely be correlated with a form of local economic
knowledge which becomes useful after 1989. In column 6 of Table 8 we add a xed eect for
households in which at least one member reports to have lived in East Germany prior to 1961. The
coecient of interest rises slightly to 0.057 (s.e.=0.023) and remains statistically signicant at the
5% level, while the eect of having lived in the East is negative and statistically insignicant.54
Consistent with this result, column 1 of Table 9 shows that even households headed by individuals
who were too young to remember living in East Germany experience a rise in their income after
1989. The specication shown again departs from our standard specication in Table 7 column
5, but interacts the dummy for ties to relatives with a xed eect for the age quartile of the
household head (and also adds xed eects for each age quartile on the right hand side). The
pattern suggests that all age groups, except those aged 52-62, prot similarly from their ties to
the East. In particular, the coecient estimate for the youngest age quartile (those aged below
40 in 1989) is positive and signicant at the 10% level, 0.092 (s.e.= 0.051). The household heads
in this group were younger than 11 years old at the time when the Berlin Wall was built and
thus could not have had much local economic knowledge about East Germany. However, they
could easily have kept in contact with their relatives in East Germany. Both pieces of evidence
thus support our view that households prot from knowing people and not from knowing places.
Second, some of the behavior we documented at the regional level, such as an increase in
entrepreneurial activity and a higher propensity of rms to invest in the East might be explained
if West Germans with social ties to the East were more optimistic about economic growth in
the newly unied Germany. We address this possibility by regressing indicators of household
optimism about the future taken from the 1990 wave of the SOEP on our dummy for social
ties to the East as well as the control variables from our standard specication. The results in
panel C of Appendix Table 7 show no evidence of systematic dierences in expectations about
aggregate economic development, individual job security or the likelihood of armed conict in
the future.55
54When we add an interaction between the dummy for ties to relatives and the xed eect for having lived in
the East the coecient of interest again remains stable at 0.061 (s.e.=0.023), and both the direct eect of having
lived in the East and the interaction remain statistically indistinguishable from zero (not reported). It may be
of some concern that the coecient on the direct eect of having lived in the East is similar in magnitude to the
coecient of interest. Nevertheless, having lived in the East is a strong and highly signicant predictor of having
ties to the East in the probit regression described above.
55All three variables are coded on a scale from 1 to 3 in which 1 represents \a major" concern and 3 represents
\no concern".
325.3.2 Heterogeneous Eects
As households who have ties to relatives in the East appear to prot from these ties post 1989 an
interesting question is whether households who are wealthier were able to benet more from their
social ties to the East. (We would expect this to be the case if social ties act primarily as conduits
for borrowing and lending in an environment in which East Germans have very little access to
credit markets.) In column 2 of Table 9 we again depart from our standard specication and
add the interaction of the ties to relatives dummy with a dummy which is one if the household's
capital income in 1989 is above the 75th percentile (we again add the main eect of this dummy
on the right hand side). The estimate on the ties to relatives dummy is very similar to that in our
standard specication (0.046, s.e.=0.026). However, the interacted variable remains insignicant,
suggesting that West German households beneted from their ties to East Germans regardless
of their wealth in 1989. Column 3 shows similar results, using the 95th percentile of household
capital income.
5.3.3 A Social Multiplier
The estimates in this section clearly show that households who have social ties to the East
internalize part of the income growth which they generate at the regional level. Although we
should be cautious when comparing the magnitude of estimates across dierent datasets, it also
seems clear that a 5 percentage point increase in the personal income of households who have
social ties to the East could not account for the large increase in income per capita which we
nd at the regional level (a one standard deviation increase (0.1) in the share of households who
experience a 5 percentage point rise in their income growth mechanically accounts for a rise in
regional income per capita of only 0.5 percentage points).56 The magnitudes of our estimates are
thus consistent with the presence of a `social multiplier', some mechanism by which households
who do not have direct social ties to the East benet from living in the same region as many
households who do.
Such a social multiplier may arise if rms based in regions with strong social ties had a
comparative advantage in investing in the East and if this comparative advantage resulted in
a local pecuniary externality (local factor prices may have risen). Alternatively, it might also
arise from a network externality through which households might benet from being connected
56If we re-run our standard specication of Table 3 Panel A, column 3 with Share Ties to Relatives '91 as
the intervening variable we get an estimate of 0.417 (s.e.=0.261), which suggests that a one standard deviation
increase in the share of the population who have ties to relatives in the East is associated with a 4.1 percentage
point higher growth rate of income per capita post 1989.
33to other households who have social ties to the East. The biography of an entrepreneur which
inspired this paper (Schulze (2005)) presents an example of such interaction at the second degree
of separation.
5.3.4 East German Households
Throughout the paper we have focused on the economic eects of social ties on outcomes in
West Germany. An obvious question is what eects the same social ties have in East Germany.
Unfortunately, we have no data on income in East Germany prior to 1990 and no information on
where in East Germany migrants lived before migrating to the West. Therefore we cannot repli-
cate our region-level results for East Germany. However, we can replicate part of our standard
specication in column 5 of Table 7 for households in East Germany. In particular, Appendix
Table 5 shows results of a regressions relating log income of East German households in the years
after German reunication to a dummy variable indicating relatives in West Germany in 1991
as well as our standard household-level covariates. As we have no data on income before 1990,
this specication can only speak to dierences in levels of income, rather than to dierences in
income growth. Nevertheless, we nd that the estimate on the coecient of interest is positive
in all years between 1990 and 1995 and marginally signicant in two of the six years (1992 and
1994). For example, the estimate for 1995 is 0.057 (s.e.=0.040) suggesting that East German
households with ties to the West may have higher incomes than those without ties to the West.
6 Conclusion
The question how social ties between individuals relate to the capacity of societies for economic
growth is of great importance in economic theory. Theorists in many elds are beginning to
incorporate network-based interactions into their models. Showing that the pattern of social ties
between individuals impacts aggregate economic outcomes highlights the relevance of their work
beyond the microeconomic context and facilitates a deeper theoretical understanding of other-
wise puzzling correlations between measures of anity between regions and aggregate economic
outcomes, such as foreign direct investment, international asset ows, and trade.
Empirical work, however, has found it dicult to resolve a double reverse causality problem:
Both the decision of individuals to form social ties and the regional distribution of individuals
who make these decisions are endogenous to economic activity.
In this paper we are able to solve both layers of this reverse causality problem in the context of
the natural experiment surrounding German reunication. We show that West German regions
34which (for idiosyncratic reasons) have a high concentration of households with social ties to the
East in 1989 exhibit substantially higher growth in income per capita after the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Moreover, we are able to provide evidence on the microeconomic underpinnings of the this
eect. We show that households who have social ties to the East in 1989 experience a persistent
rise in their personal incomes and that their presence increases returns to entrepreneurial activity
at the regional level as well as the likelihood that local rms invest in East Germany. These
ndings appear robust to a wide range of plausible variations in the estimation strategy and
placebo treatments. They show that social ties between individuals can indeed facilitate economic
growth.
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Notes: The gure depicts coecient estimates from city-level regressions of population growth on share housing destroyed during
World War II. We ran separate regressions for each time interval shown on the horizontal axis of the gure. In each of these
regressions the dependent variable is city population growth in the time interval shown. The explanatory variable is always city-level
Share Housing Destroyed '46 and a constant. The bars in the gure present the respective coecient estimates on Share Housing
Destroyed '46, the crosses give 90% condence intervals. Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account
for potential heteroscedasticity. The city-level population panel is unbalanced. It contains information for between 144 and 165 cities
on population growth between 1925-1933, 1933-1939, 1970-1979, 1979-1989, and 1989-2000; it contains information for 73 cities on
population growth between 1939-1946, and 1946-1950; but it only contains information for 17 cities on population growth between
1950-1960, and 1960-1970. Missing data tends to be from smaller cities. The black dashed lines indicate the time of World War II,
the red dashed line indicates the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall.





















































































































































































































































































Notes: The gure depicts coecient estimates and 95% condence intervals from the following regression using the SOEP household
panel: The dependent variable is the log of household income in a given year. The explanatory variables of interest - the coecients
on which are plotted in the gure - are the interactions of Ties to Relatives '91 with a full set of year dummies (hence not including
the main eect). The regression controls for log of household income in 1985, gender, age and age squared. It as well includes region
and year xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the regional level to correct for temporal correlation.
39Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: Region-Level Data All Low Destr. High Destr.
Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 0.048 0.049 0.047
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015)
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 0.119 0.143 0.095
(0.045) (0.041) (0.036)
Share Ties to Relatives '91 0.223 0.235 0.211
(0.100) (0.114) (0.085)
Share Housing Destroyed '46 0.321 0.154 0.493
(0.210) (0.108) (0.141)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 0.090 0.037 0.144
(0.070) (0.033) (0.056)
Distance to East (100km) 1.753 1.504 2.010
(1.075) (1.071) (1.046)
Income 1985 (DM, p.c.) 1598 1568 1628
(126) (140) (104)
Income 1989 (DM, p.c.) 1761 1747 1775
(131) (147) (114)
Income 1995 (DM, p.c.) 2222 2227 2218
(154) (166) (143)
N 71 35 36
PANEL B: Firm-Level Data All Low Destr. High Destr.
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 0.443 0.437 0.450
(0.742) (0.729) (0.756)
S. & B. in East Germany (Dummy) 0.077 0.083 0.072
(0.267) (0.275) (0.259)
S. & B. in Non-EU Countries (Dummy) 0.018 0.018 0.017
(0.131) (0.134) (0.129)
N 19420 9726 9694
PANEL C: Household-Level Data All Ties No Ties
Age '90 51.2 51.5 50.4
(14.6) (15.0) (13.6)
Gender 0.29 0.33 0.22
(0.46) (0.47) (0.41)
Years of Education '89 12.21 12.12 12.42
(1.84) (1.80) (1.91)
Income 1989 (SOEP) 3304 3219 3492
(1856) (1935) (1656)
Capital Income '89 783 799 746
(1729) (1867) (1378)
Entrepreneur '89 0.046 0.045 0.047
(0.209) (0.207) (0.212)
Not Employed '89 0.075 0.079 0.065
(0.263) (0.270) (0.247)
N 1911 597 1314
Notes: The table presents means (and standard deviations). Variables in Panel A refer to our sample of regions
used in Tables 2 through 5. Variables in Panel B refer to our sample of rms used in Tables 6 and 6. Panel C
refers to our sample of households from the SOEP panel used in Tables 7 through 9. Column 1 shows data for
all observations. In Panel A, columns 2 and 3 show data for regions in which Share Housing Destroyed '46 is
above and below the median, respectively. In Panel B, columns 2 and 3 present means and standard deviations for
rms headquartered in regions with Share Housing Destroyed '46 above and below the median, respectively. S. &
B. stands for subsidiaries and branches which rms headquartered in a given West German region operate in the
indicated location. In Panel C, columns 2 and 3 show data for households with ties to relatives in East Germany
and without ties to relatives in East Germany, respectively. Monetary values are given in nominal Deutsche Mark.
See data appendix for details.Table 2: Wartime Destruction, Social Ties, and Income Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: First Stage Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) -0.044***
(0.013)
Distance to East (100km) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.025* 0.047***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.026 -0.020 -0.028 -0.029 -0.026
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
Migration from East '91-'95 -0.006
(0.212)
R2 0.918 0.920 0.905 0.989 0.931 0.920
PANEL B: First Stage (alternative) Share Ties to Relatives '91
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.099** -0.102** -0.095* -0.102** -0.101**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.041) (0.047)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) -0.161
(0.146)
PANEL C: Reduced Form Income '95/'89 (p.c., log)
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.042* -0.048** -0.060** -0.052** -0.058*** -0.047**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 0.046
(0.071)
N 71 71 71 71 71 71
Distance Quartile Fixed Eects - - - yes - -
Sector Controls - - - - yes -
Notes: Coecient estimates from ordinary least squares regressions at the regional level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. The main variable of
interest in all columns except column 3 is the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946, Share Housing
Destroyed '46. In column 3 of Panels A and B the main variable of interest is Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.). In column 3 of Panel C
both of these variables are included. The dependent variable in Panel A is our main proxy for social ties to East Germany, Share
Expellees (Sov. Sector) 61. The dependent variable in Panel B is our alternative measure of social ties to the East: the share of
the population which states in the 1991 SOEP survey to have relatives in East Germany, Share Ties to Relatives 91. In Panel C
the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the region's mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. All regressions include 10
state xed eects. All specications in Panel B and C include the same controls as shown in Panel A. The coecient estimates
on these are not reported to save space. Column 4 controls for 4 distance dummies, corresponding to the quartiles of the distance
measure. Column 5 controls for the share of the 1989 population working in agriculture, manufacturing, services and government,
respectively. The specication in column 6 controls for the share of the region's population who are migrants arriving from East
Germany between 1991 and 1995.Table 3: Social Ties and Income Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(IV) (OLS) (IV)
PANEL A: Main Results Income '95/'89 (p.c., log)
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 2.169** 1.963*** 2.442*** 2.453*** 2.526*** 2.772*** 2.366***
(0.947) (0.574) (0.880) (0.877) (0.885) (0.854) (0.878)
Distance to East (100km) 0.011** 0.008** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Income 1989 (p.c., log) -0.267*** -0.189*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.212*** -0.305*** -0.206***
(0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.072) (0.062)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.362*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.379*** -0.278*** -0.353***
(0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.083) (0.087)
Sh. Employed in Agricult. '89 -0.115
(0.295)
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 -0.301
(0.283)
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.145
(0.290)
Sh. Employed in Governm.'89 -0.522
(0.397)
Migration from East '91-'95 0.349
(1.130)
R2 0.505 0.598 0.590 0.589 0.567 0.642 0.593
PANEL B: Placebo Income '89/'85 (p.c., log)
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 - 0.656 0.560 0.557 0.672 0.443 0.790
- (0.602) (1.024) (1.029) (0.939) (1.100) (1.041)
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
Distance Quartile Fixed Eects - - - - yes - -
Instruments Housing - Housing Housing Housing Housing Housing
& Rubble
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from instrumental variable regressions at the regional level in columns 1 and 3 through 7.
Column 2 reports results from an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The standard errors are
calculated using the Huber-White correction to correct for potential heteroscedasticity. In Panel A the dependent variable is the log of
the ratio of mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. In Panel B it is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985.
The main variable of interest in all columns is Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 . In columns 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 we instrument for this
variable with Share Housing Destroyed 46. In column 4 we use Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) as an additional instrument. First stage results are
shown in Table 2. All regressions include 10 state xed eects. In Panel A all regressions control for the log of mean per capita income
in 1989 and columns 2-7 include the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985 as control. In Panel B all regressions
control for the log of per capita income in 1985. All regressions except column 5 control for a region's distance to the inner-German
border. The specications shown in column 5 control for 4 distance dummies, corresponding to the quartiles of the distance measure. The
regressions shown in column 6 control for the share of the 1989 population working in agriculture, manufacturing, services and government,
respectively. The specications shown in column 7 controls for the share of the region's population who are migrants arriving from East
Germany between 1991 and 1995. In Panel B we do not report results for covariates to save space.Table 4: Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Income '95/'89 (p.c., log)
(OLS) (IV)
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 2.131*** 2.150*** 2.039*** 3.422* 3.396* 2.943*
(0.706) (0.727) (0.561) (1.809) (1.787) (1.738)
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 -0.092 -0.099 -0.043 -0.350 -0.371 -0.065
(0.150) (0.161) (0.155) (0.624) (0.660) (0.698)
Sh. Employed in Agricult. '89 0.047 -0.028 0.139 -0.114
(0.193) (0.304) (0.272) (0.297)
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 -0.197 -0.316
(0.252) (0.308)
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.240 0.121
(0.253) (0.333)
Sh. Employed in Governm.'89 -0.452 -0.535
(0.429) (0.413)
R2 0.600 0.600 0.664 0.557 0.561 0.640
Instruments - - - Housing Housing Housing
& Rubble & Rubble & Rubble
PANEL B: First Stage Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
PANEL C: First Stage Share Expellees (Direct) '61
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) -0.107** -0.106** -0.104**
(0.046) (0.045) (0.051)
N 71 71 71 71 71 71
Standard Region-Level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Panel A reports coecient estimates from ordinary least squares regressions at the regional level in columns 1 through
3. Columns 4 through 6 report results from instrumental variable regressions. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. In Panel A
the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. The main variables of interest
are Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 and Share Expellees (Direct) '61. In the specications in columns 4 through 6 of
Panel A we instrument for these variables with Share Housing Destroyed 46 and Rubble 46 (m3 p.c.). The corresponding
rst stage regressions are given in columns 4-6 of Panel B and C. All regressions control for a region's distance to the
inner-German border, the log of mean per capita income in 1989 and the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989
and 1985. All regressions include 10 state xed eects. Coecient estimates for these controls are not shown to save space.Table 5: Social Ties and Entrepreneurial Activity
(1) (2) (3)
Income '95/'89 (p.c., log) Share
Entrepreneurs Non-Entrepreneurs Entrepreneur 1995
(3SLS) (IV)
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 4.516*** 1.491** 0.322*
(1.668) (0.676) (0.163)
Income Entrepreneurs '89 (p.c., log) -0.622***
(0.147)
Income Non-Entrepreneurs '89 (p.c., log) -2.079***
(0.456)
Share Entrepreneurs '89 0.496***
(0.104)
R2 0.577 0.661 0.794
N 71 71 71
Standard Region-Level Controls yes yes yes
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from regressions at the regional level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income of entrepreneurs in 1995 and 1989.
The dependent variable in column 2 is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income of non-entrepreneurs in 1995 and
1989. Column 1 and 2 are estimated jointly with three stage least squares, instrumenting for Share Expellees (Soviet Sector)
'61 with Share Housing Destroyed '46. First stage results are not reported. In column 3, which shows results from an
instrumental variables regression, the dependent variable is the share of individuals who report in 1995 to be entrepreneur.
Again we instrument for Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 with Share Housing Destroyed '46. The standard errors in
column 3 are calculated using the Huber-White correction to correct for potential heteroscedasticity. First stage results
are shown in Table 2. The main variable of interest in all columns is Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61. All regressions
control for a region's distance to the inner-German border, the log of mean per capita income in 1989 and the log of the
ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985. All regressions include 10 state xed eects. Coecient estimates on
these controls are not reported to save space. For details on the construction of the variables see data appendix. We reject
the equality of the coecients on Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 in column 1 and 2 (p-value= 0:070).Table 6: Social Ties and Firm Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: Reduced Form S. & B. in East Germany (Dummy)
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.026** -0.028*** -0.031***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Distance to East (100km) -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 0.009 -0.026 0.051 0.006
(0.033) (0.041) (0.059) (0.032)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.003 -0.003 -0.019 -0.007
(0.034) (0.036) (0.045) (0.034)
Migration from East'91-'95 -1.644
(1.198)
R2 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.127 0.127
N 19387 19387 19387 19387 19387
PANEL B: Second Stage
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 1.579** 1.497** 1.262** 1.412** 1.519**
(0.689) (0.664) (0.581) (0.579) (0.643)
PANEL C: Second Stage S. & B. in Poland (Dummy)
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.281** 0.291** 0.308** 0.282** 0.300**
(0.137) (0.135) (0.131) (0.132) (0.130)
PANEL D: Placebo S. & B. in Old EU Countries (Dummy)
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.060 0.408 0.392 0.371 0.429
(0.580) (0.543) (0.521) (0.516) (0.522)
PANEL E: Placebo S. & B. in New EU, exc. Poland (Dummy)
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.188 0.180 0.160 0.174 0.208
(0.206) (0.209) (0.197) (0.210) (0.202)
PANEL F: Placebo S. & B. in Non-EU Countries (Dummy)
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.034 0.137 0.122 0.144 0.158
(0.304) (0.290) (0.276) (0.286) (0.277)
N 19387 19387 19387 19387 19387
Firm-Level Sector Fixed Eects yes yes yes yes yes
Distance Quartile Fixed Eects - - yes - -
Region-Level Sector Controls - - - yes -
Notes: All Panels report rm-level regression results, using our sample of rms which are headquartered in
West Germany. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for likely spatial correlation.
Panel A reports results from rm-level ordinary least squares regressions. Panel B-F report results of rm-
level instrumental variables regressions. The main variable of interest in these specications is Share Expellees
(Soviet Sector) '61. We instrument for this variable with Share Housing Destroyed '46. Corresponding rst
stage results at the regional level are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in Panels A and B is a
dummy indicating whether a rm has a subsidiary or branch in East Germany. The dependent variables in
panels C-F are dummies which indicate whether a rm has a subsidiary or branch in the specied location.
All regressions include 10 state xed eects and 4 rm-level sector xed eects (agriculture, manufacturing,
services, government). We control for distance to the inner-German border at the district level. Log of per
capita income in 1989 and log of the ratio of per capita income in 1989 and 1985 are regional level controls.
Column 3 controls for 4 distance dummies, corresponding to quartiles of the distance measure. Column
4 controls for the share of a region's 1989 population working in agriculture, manufacturing, services and
government, respectively. The specication in column 5 controls for the share of the region's population who
are migrants arriving from East Germany between 1991 and 1995. All specications in Panels B-E include the
same controls as the specication in Panel A, which we do not report to save space.Table 7: Region- and Household-Level Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income '95/'89 (log)
Level (Source) Aggregate (MZ) Household (SOEP)
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 2.442*** 2.777
(0.880) (3.609)
Ties to Relatives '91 0.069*** 0.046** 0.049**
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Income 1989 (p.c., log, MZ) -0.209*** 0.166 0.267** 0.260*
(0.060) (0.186) (0.126) (0.137)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log, MZ) -0.355*** -0.649 -0.664 -0.798*
(0.086) (0.446) (0.449) (0.450)
Distance to East (100km) 0.011** 0.001 -0.009 -0.008
(0.004) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
Income 1989 (log, SOEP) -0.242*** -0.248*** -0.340*** -0.338***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
Income '89/'85 (log, SOEP) -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.144*** -0.146***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029)
Gender -0.157*** -0.162***
(0.024) (0.024)
Age '90 -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005)
(Age '90)2 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.590 0.137 0.143 0.249 0.288
N 71 1911 1911 1911 1911
Fixed Eects State State State State Region
Notes: Column 1 shows results of a region-level instrumental variables regression. Columns 2-5 show results from
household-level regressions. In column 1 and 2 we instrument for the regional Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 with
Share Housing Destroyed '46. First stage results are shown in Table 2. Columns 3-5 report results from ordinary least
squares regressions. The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of the ratio of per capita income in 1995 and 1989 at
the regional level. The dependent variable in columns 2-5 is the log of the ratio of household income in 1995 and 1989.
Columns 1 through 4 control for the same region-level variables as column 3 in Table 3. Columns 2 through 5 control
at the household level for the log of household income in 1989 and the log of the ratio of household income in 1989
and 1985. Columns 4 and 5 also control for the gender, age and age squared of the household head. The specications
in columns 1 through 4 include 10 state xed eects. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the regional level, which for columns 1 through 4 coincides with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Column 5 includes 71 region xed eects. See data appendix for details on the construction of our variables.Table 8: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Full Sample Income '95/'89 (log)
Ties to Relatives '91 0.049** 0.053** 0.043** 0.049** 0.047** 0.057**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Occupation: Civil Servant '89 0.007
(0.040)
Sector: Government '89 0.109***
(0.040)
Years of Education '89 0.042
(0.060)
(Years of Education '89)2 0.000
(0.002)
Occupation: Entrepreneur '89 0.058
(0.071)
Transfers to Relatives '90-'95 (log) 0.001
(0.010)
Lived in East Germany -0.052
(0.043)
R2 0.288 0.294 0.326 0.289 0.286 0.289
N 1911 1911 1911 1911 1905 1911
PANEL B: Restricted Sample Income '95/'89 (log)
Ties to Relatives '91 0.059** 0.064** 0.050** 0.059** 0.055** 0.065**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
R2 0.298 0.305 0.341 0.299 0.297 0.299
N 1580 1580 1580 1580 1575 1580
Household-Level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from weighted least squares regressions at the household level. The inverse of
the sampling probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. Standard errors, clustered at the region level to account for
spatial correlation, are given in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of the ratio of household
income in 1995 and 1989. Columns 1 replicates the results from the household-level regression in column 5 in Table 7. All
specications include, additional to the shown covariates, the same controls as the specication in column 5 in Table 7. We
do not report results for expositional clarity. Panel A reports results using the full sample. In Panel B we replicate the
regressions from Panel A using a restricted sample. In this sample we exclude households who did not have operational
assets in 1989, but report to have such assets in 1995 as well as all households which report to have income from renting
out property in 1995. For expositional clarity we do not report results on covariates. See data appendix for details on the
construction of our variables.Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Income '95/'89 (log)
Ties  Age Group below 40 0.092*
(0.051)
Ties  Age Group 40-51 -0.052
(0.044)
Ties  Age Group 52-62 0.108**
(0.052)
Ties  Age Group above 62 0.063*
(0.037)
Ties to Relatives '91 0.046* 0.052**
(0.026) (0.024)
Ties  Capital Income '89 (75th percentile) 0.011
(0.047)
Ties  Capital Income '89 (95th percentile) -0.036
(0.112)
R2 0.448 0.290 0.288
N 1911 1911 1911
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from weighted least squares regressions
at the household level. The inverse of the sampling probability provided by SOEP is
used as weights. Standard errors, clustered at the region level to account for spatial
correlation, are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of
household income in 1995 and 1989. All regressions include the same controls as column
5 of Table 7 (not reported). In column 1 the variables of interest are the interactions of
the dummy Ties to Relatives '91 with 4 exhaustive cohort dummies, for the age quartile
of the household head (`below 40', `between 40 and 51', `between 52 and 62' and `above
62'). The specications in columns 2 and 3 use Ties to Relatives '91 as explanatory
variable and control for a dummy indicating whether the household has capital income
above the 75th or 95th percentile of the capital income distribution, respectively, as well
as the interaction of the dummy and Ties to Relatives '91. See data appendix for details.A Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
Appendix Table 1 - Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Source
PANEL A: Original variables
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 Share of the total region/district population in 1961
that is made up by expellees from the former Eastern
territories of the German Reich who settled in the So-
viet sector before arriving in Western Germany (the
Western sectors). The exact census denition of this
group is given in Statistisches Bundesamt (1961),
p.4.
1961 Census
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 Share of the total region/district population in 1961
that is made up by expellees from the former East-
ern territories of the German Reich who did not set-
tle in the Soviet sector before arriving in Western
Germany (the Western sectors). The exact census
denition of this group is given in Statistisches Bun-
desamt (1961), p.4.
1961 Census
Share Ties to Relatives '91 The respondents were asked whether they had rela-
tives in the other part of Germany. We calculated
the share of people who responded armatively.
SOEP (1991)
Subsidiaries and Branches in loca Number of subsidiaries and branches registered in
loc belonging to the rm.
ORBIS (2007)
Share of Housing Destroyed '46 Destroyed apartments and houses in 1946 as a share
of the stock of apartments and houses in 1939.
German Association of
Cities (1949)
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) Untreated rubble in 1946 in cubic meters per capita. German Association of
Cities (1949)
Income t (p.c., log, MZ) Log of average income in Deutsche Mark. This infor-
mation is not publicly available at the region level.
We have extracted it from the German Mikrozen-
sus, a yearly survey of a random 1% sample of the
population. The question used asks for the house-
hold's average income per household member and
the respondent selects an income bracket in which
his household falls. We use the mean of the bounds
of the brackets to calculate the average income per




Income Entrepreneurs t (p.c.,
log)
Log average income in Deutsche Mark for the
subgroup of individuals who indicated to be `en-





Log average income in Deutsche Mark for the sub-
group of individuals who indicated to have an oc-




Share Entrepreneur t Regional share of individuals who indicate that they
are an entrepreneur (with or without employees).
German Mikrozensus
(1989)
Share Employed in x '89 Regional share of individuals who indicate to be
working in sector x.
German Mikrozensus
(1989)
Distance to East (100km) Closest distance from a region's center to the former
GDR border in 100 km.
- own calculations -
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Variable Description Source
Migration from East '91-'95 Sum of the share of surveyed individuals who mi-
grated to the region in the years 1991, 1993 and
1995 from East Germany.
German Mikrozensus
(1991, 1993, 1995)
Ties to Relatives '91 (Dummy) Dummy indicating whether household head or an-
other person in the same household had relatives in
the other part of Germany in 1991.
German SOEP (1991)
Income t (log, SOEP) Log of income in German Mark (plus 1) of household
head in year t .
German SOEP
Gender Gender of the household head. German SOEP (1989)
Age '90 Age of household head in 1990. German SOEP (1989)
Years of Education '89 Years of education (including professional educa-
tion) of highest ranked individual in the household
for whom income data exists. Usually this will be
the household head.
German SOEP (1989)
Capital Income '89 Log of household capital income (plus 1) in 1989. German SOEP (1989)
Occupation '89 We aggregated the occupations given in the German
SOEP to the 8 categories `Not Employed', `Pen-
sioner', `In Education/Military Service', `Worker',
`Farmer', `White Collar', `Entrepreneur' and `Civil
Servant'.
German SOEP (1989)
Industry Sector '89 This uses information on the industrial sector in
which the household head works, given in the Ger-
man SOEP. We aggregated the sectors into the 4
categories `Agriculture', `Manufacturing', `Services',
and `Government'.
German SOEP (1989)
Ownership of Assets t (D) Two dummy variables indicating whether the house-
hold owns `Financial Securities' and `Operating As-
sets' in year t.
German SOEP
Sources of Income '89 Four variables indicating the natural logarithm of
the household income in German Mark from four
sources (plus 1): `Entrepreneurial Activity', `Em-
ployment', `Prot Share', and `Financial Securities'.
German SOEP (1989)
Aliations '89 Two dummy variables which indicate `Union Mem-
bership' and `Membership in a Professional Associ-
ation' of the household head.
German SOEP (1989)
Transfers from Relatives t (log) The natural logarithm of the amount (plus 1) of
transfers in German Marks the household received
from relatives in year t.
German SOEP
Transfers to Relatives t (log) The natural logarithm of the amount (plus 1) of
transfers in German Marks paid to relatives (other
than parents and children) in year t.
German SOEP
Concern about s '90 The level of concern the household head has about
topic s, where s is `Aggregate Economic Develop-
ment', `Preservation of Peace', and `Individual Job
Security'. All three variables take values 1,2, or 3,
with 1 being the most concerned and 3 being the
least concerned.
German SOEP (1990)
PANEL B: Generated variables
Income t1=t0 (p.c., log) Income t1 (p.c., log) - Income t0 (p.c., log).
Share of Total Subsidiaries and
Branches in loca
Number of subsidiaries and branches in loc over
the sum of this and the number of subsidiaries and
branches in West Germany.
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Variable Description Source
Subsidiaries and Branches in loca
(Dummy)
Dummy variable that indicates whether the rm op-
erates at least one subsidiary or branch in loc.
Subsidiaries and Branches in loca
(log)
Logarithm of the number of subsidiaries and
branches in loc.
Income t (p.c., log, SOEP) Log of average income in the region, using the SOEP
data.
Income t1=t0 (log, SOEP) Income t1 (p.c., log, SOEP) - Income t0 (p.c., log,
SOEP)
Transfers from Relatives '90-'95
(log)
The natural logarithm of the nominal sum (plus 1)
in German Marks of Transfers from Relatives over
the years 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1995.
Transfers to Relatives '90-'95
(log)
The natural logarithm of the nominal sum (plus 1)
in German Marks of Transfers to Relatives over the
years 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1995.
a Where loc stands for East Germany, West Germany, `New' EU Countries, `Old' EU Countries, and Non-EU
Countries.Appendix Table 2: GMM Using Panel Structure
(1) (2) (3)
Income (p.c., log)
Share Expellees  1995 2.813*** 2.871*** 2.538***
(1.023) (0.960) (0.916)
Share Expellees  1993 2.059** 2.117** 1.783*
(1.022) (0.959) (0.915)
Share Expellees  1991 1.532 1.590* 1.257
(1.022) (0.959) (0.916)
Share Expellees  1989 0.506 0.564
(1.022) (0.961)
Share Expellees  1987 -0.329
(1.023)
Income 1985 (p.c., log) 0.864***
(0.030)
Income 1987 (p.c., log) 0.859***
(0.030)
Income '87/'85 (p.c., log) -0.487***
(0.059)
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 0.871***
(0.031)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.445***
(0.055)
Distance to East (100km) 0.003 0.005** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 563 492 421
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from an asymptotically ef-
cient two-step GMM estimation. In the rst step we applied the Bartlett
kernel to estimate the covariances of the errors up to one lag. The de-
pendent variable is the log of mean per capita income in year t. The
main variable of interest in all columns is Share Expellees (Soviet Sec-
tor) '61. We interacted this with a full set of possible year dummies
(dierent across columns) and hence the main eect is not included. We
instrument for these interactions with the interaction of the same year
dummies with Share Housing Destroyed '46. All regressions control for a
region's distance to the inner-German border and include state-year xed
eects. Column 1 controls for the log of the mean per capita income in
1985, column 2 controls for the log of the mean per capita income in 1987
and column 3 controls for the log of the mean per capita income in 1989.
Column 2 also controls for log of the ratio of mean per capita income in
1987 and 1985. Column 3 also controls for log of the ratio of mean per
capita income in 1989 and 1985.Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics (Expellees, Census '71)
(1) (2) (3)
Ex. (Soviet Sector) Ex. (Direct) West Germans
Years of Schooling '71 9.69 9.63 9.81
(1.19) (1.11) (1.50)
Share Entrepreneur '71 0.03 0.03 0.06
Labor Force Participation '71 0.52 0.54 0.55
Agriculture '71 0.04 0.05 0.12
Manufacturing '71 0.51 0.53 0.44
Services '71 0.33 0.30 0.32
Government '71 0.12 0.13 0.11
N 10120 49638 322240
Notes: Appendix Table 3 shows means, standard deviations in parentheses. Data is from the 1971
edition of the German Census. Column 1 shows summary statistics for expellees via the Soviet
sector. Column 2 shows summary statistics for direct expellees. Column 3 shows data for all
remaining individuals excluding refugees. Income in 1971 is given in nominal Deutsche Mark. Labor
force participation and share entrepreneur are given relative to the entire population. The sectoral
distribution is given relative to all working individuals.Appendix Table 4: Direct Expellees and Expellees via Soviet Sector
(a) War Destruction and Regional Characteristics '89
(1) (2)
Coecient p-value
Outcome Variable Share Housing Destr. '46 (H0: No Conditional Corr.)
Years of Schooling '89 0.053 0.556
(0.089)
Share Entrepreneur '89 -0.006 0.307
(0.006)
Share Unemployed '89 0.004 0.401
(0.005)
Sh. Employed in Agriculture '89 -0.012 0.125
(0.008)
Sh. Employed in Manufacturing '89 0.000 0.990
(0.026)
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.013 0.365
(0.014)
Sh. Employed in Government '89 -0.006 0.619
(0.013)
(b) Expellee Settlement and Regional Characteristics '89
(1) (2) (3)
Coecient p-value
Outcome Variable Ex. (Soviet Sector) Ex. (Direct) (H0: Equality of Coe.)
Years of Schooling '89 -0.398 -0.538 0.956
(2.108) (0.678)
Share Entrepreneur '89 0.017 0.033 0.937
(0.161) (0.047)
Share Unemployed '89 -0.130 -0.036 0.509
(0.121) (0.031)
Sh. Employed in Agriculture '89 -0.406* 0.151* 0.059
(0.240) (0.081)
Sh. Employed in Manufacturing '89 0.877 -0.022 0.350
(0.806) (0.222)
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.447 -0.195 0.338
(0.558) (0.162)
Sh. Employed in Government '89 -0.323 0.005 0.395
(0.355) (0.066)
Notes: Part A of Appendix Table 4 presents results from ordinary least squares regressions of the outcome variable
shown in the leftmost column on Share Housing Destroyed and the same controls as column 3 of Table 3. Each row
represents an independent regression and we only report the coecient estimates on the share of housing destruction
in column 1. Column 2 gives the p-value of a t-test of the equality of the coecient in column 1 to 0. Part B presents
results from ordinary least squares regressions of the outcome variable shown in the leftmost column on Share Expellees
(Soviet Sector), the Share Expellees (Direct) and the same controls as column 3 of Table 3. Each row represents an
independent regression and we only report the coecient estimates on the shares of the two types of expellees in column
1 and column 2. Column 3 gives the p-value of a t-test of the equality of the coecients in column 1 and 2. In both
Part A and B standard errors are given in parentheses and calculated using the Huber-White correction to correct for
potential heteroscedasticity.Appendix Table 5: Social Ties and Firm Investment (Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of Total S. & B. in East Germany
PANEL A: Reduced Form
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.012** -0.012** -0.011** -0.012** -0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 1989 (p.c., log) -0.001 -0.017 0.017 -0.003
(0.012) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012)
Distance to East (100km) -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Migration from East'91-'95 -0.704
(0.517)
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025
PANEL B: IV
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.646** 0.609** 0.539** 0.586** 0.620**
(0.298) (0.283) (0.258) (0.258) (0.275)
N 19387 19387 19387 19387 19387
Firm-Level Sector Fixed Eects yes yes yes yes yes
Distance Quartile Fixed Eects - - yes - -
Region-Level Sector Controls - - - yes -
Notes: All Panels report rm-level regression results using our sample of rms which are headquartered in
West Germany. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for likely spatial correlation.
Panel A reports results from rm-level ordinary least squares regressions. Panel B reports results of rm-level
instrumental variables regressions. The main variable of interest in these specications is Share Expellees (Soviet
Sector) '61. We instrument for this variable with Share Housing Destroyed '46. Corresponding rst stage results
at the regional level are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in both panels is the number of a rm's
subsidiaries and branches located in East Germany relative to the number of its subsidiaries and branches in
all of Germany. All regressions include 10 state xed eects and 4 rm-level sector xed eects (agriculture,
manufacturing, services, government). We control for distance to the inner-German border at the district level.
Log of per capita income in 1989 and log of the ratio of per capita income in 1989 and 1985 are regional
level controls. Column 3 controls for 4 distance dummies, corresponding to quartiles of the distance measure.
Column 4 controls for the share of a region's 1989 population working in agriculture, manufacturing, services
and government, respectively. The specication in column 5 controls for the share of the region's population
who are migrants arriving from East Germany between 1991 and 1995. All specications in Panels B-E include
the same controls as the specication in Panel A, which we do not report to save space.Appendix Table 6: Sector Specific Effects
S. & B. in East N
Germany (Dummy)
Expellees '61  Agriculture 3.382 313
(4.310)
Expellees '61  Services 2.142** 15521
(0.993)
Expellees '61  Manufacturing 0.156 3225
(1.784)




Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from a rm-level instrumental variables regression
using our sample of rms which are headquartered in West Germany. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for likely spatial correlation.
The main variable of interest is the interaction of 4 exhaustive sectoral xed eects (agriculture,
manufacturing, services and government) with Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61. (The main eect
of Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 is hence not included.) We instrument with the interaction
of the sectoral xed eects and Share Housing Destroyed 46. The dependent variable is a dummy
indicating whether a rm has a subsidiary or branch in East Germany. The regression includes
10 state xed eects and the 4 rm-level sector xed eects (agriculture, manufacturing, services,
government). It also includes the same controls as the specications in column 2 of Table 6. We do
not report these coecients on these controls to save space. The second column shows the number
of rms in each sector.Appendix Table 7: Conditional Differences between Households with and without Ties
Coecient (St. Err) on
Outcome Variable Ties to Relatives '91 N
PANEL A: Socio-Economic Characteristics
Education
Years of Education '89 0.113 (0.094) 1911
Occupational Status
Not Employed '89 0.004 (0.017) 1911
In Education/Military Service '89 -0.003 (0.005) 1911
Pensioner '89 0.012 (0.015) 1911
Worker '89 0.011 (0.022) 1911
Entrepreneur '89 -0.006 (0.005) 1911
White Collar '89 0.011 (0.019) 1911
Civil Servant '89 -0.023* (0.013) 1911
Industry Sector
Agriculture '89 -0.007 (0.005) 1911
Manufacturing '89 0.024 (0.019) 1911
Services '89 0.016 (0.017) 1911
Government '89 -0.037** (0.015) 1911
Ownership of Assets
Financial Securities '89 (D) 0.031 (0.020) 1911
Operating Assets '89 (D) -0.008 (0.010) 1911
Sources of Income
Entrepreneurial Activity '89 (log) -0.097 (0.109) 1903
Employment '89 (log) 0.075 (0.174) 1899
Prot Share '89 (log) 0.078 (0.087) 1909
Capital (Financial Securities) '89 (log) 0.121 (0.108) 1911
Aliations
Union Membership '89 -0.025 (0.022) 1911
Membership in a Professional Association '89 -0.013 (0.016) 1911
PANEL B: Transfers
Transfers from Relatives '89 (log) 0.054 (0.058) 1910
Transfers to Relatives '89 (log) 0.234*** (0.065) 1911
Transfers from Relatives '90-'95 (log) 0.102 (0.064) 1905
Transfers to Relatives '90-'95 (log) 0.278** (0.115) 1910
PANEL C: Expectations
Concern about Aggregate Economic Development '90 0.020 (0.038) 1900
Concern about Preservation of Peace '90 0.030 (0.038) 1897
Concern about Individual Job Security '90 0.013 (0.040) 1169
Notes: The table shows results from ordinary least squares regressions of the outcome variable shown in the leftmost
column on Ties to Relatives '91 and the same controls as column 5 of Table 7. Each row represents an independent
regression and we only report the coecient estimate and standard error on Ties to Relatives '91. Standard errors
are given in parentheses and calculated using the Huber-White correction to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.
The last column shows the sample size.Appendix Table 8: East Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income (log, SOEP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Ties to Relatives '91 0.058 0.047 0.078* 0.046 0.068* 0.057
(0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.032) (0.036) (0.040)
Gender -0.130*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.139***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
Age '90 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
(Age '90)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.399 0.283 0.255 0.260 0.221 0.228
N 1506 1492 1473 1462 1474 1506
Notes: The table reports coecient estimates from weighted least squares regressions at the household level. It
uses the sample of households located in East Germany in both 1990 and 1995. The inverse of the sampling
probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. Standard errors, clustered at the regional level to correct
for spatial correlation, are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of household income in the
specied year. The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy indicating ties to relatives in West Germany.
All specications include a full set of region xed eects. See data appendix for details.Appendix Figure 1: Share of Housing Destroyed
                                   Appendix Figure 1 
Share of Housing Destroyed (quintiles, red being most destroyed)
Notes: The gure presents the level of Share Housing Destroyed '46 in West German regions. The 5 colors refer to the 5 quintiles of
war destruction, with red indicating those regions worst destroyed and green indicating the least destroyed regions. The cut-o values
for the quintiles of share housing destroyed are 0.093, 0.267, 0.377 and 0.526, respectively. The median level of housing destroyed in





































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The gure is a conditional scatterplot of Share Housing Destroyed '46 and Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 at the regional
level. The corresponding rst stage regression (shown in column 2 of Panel A of Table 2) controls for distance to the inner-German
border, the log of per capita income in 1989, the log of the ratio of per capita income in 1989 and 1985 and a full set of state xed
eects. The solid line depicts the tted regression line. The coecient estimate is -0.020 (s.e.=0.005) and signicant at the 1% level.











































































































































































































Notes: The gure is a scatterplot of our two measures of social ties, Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 and Share Ties to Relatives
'91. The solid line depicts the tted regression line from an ordinary least squares regression of Share Ties to Relatives '91 on Share
Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 and a constant. The coecient estimate on Share Expellees (Soviet Sector) '61 is 3.41 (s.e.=0.54) and

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The gure is a conditional scatterplot of the log of the ratio of per capita income in 1995 and 1989 and Share Housing
Destroyed '46. The reduced form regression corresponding to this plot, presented in column 2 of Panel C of Table 2, controls for
distance to the inner-German border, the log of per capita income in 1989, the log of the ratio of per capita income in 1989 and
1985 and a full set of state xed eects. The solid line depicts the estimated linear relation between the log of the ratio of per capita
income in 1995 and 1989 and share housing destroyed. The coecient estimate is -0.048 (s.e.=0.020) and signicant at the 5% level.
(Standard errors calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity.)